ࡱ> WYJKLMNOPQRSTUV[}c hjbjbSS ' 11^]D4 4 4 4 d 4 ~. R R h ~~~~~~~,~~R h B d8R h ~L@~~B#j w~ Ύ4 4 }STRATEGIC SURPRISE SEMINAR (PROJECT ELLIS REPORT NUMBER 4) 27 Oct 1999    Sponsored by: Wargaming Division Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory Quantico, VA 22134-5069   5205 Leesburg Pike Falls Church, VA 22041 703-578-1700 Fax: 703-578-1704 www.gamacorp.com  Final Report: Strategic Surprise Seminar -- Project Ellis 4  1. Introduction. Project Ellis Seminar Number Four was the culmination of the initial four event series on the subject of strategic surprise. It was conducted in Breckinridge Hall, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA on 27 October 1999. The objective was to review the results of the first three seminar events and then provide recommendations as to alternative courses of action for the second year of the project. Results of the first three events were presented as summary matrices. These matrices are contained in Appendix A. The participants in Ellis 4 are listed in Appendix B. 2. Background. Project Ellis is named for Major Pete Ellis, who perceived a major shift in the strategic landscape after World War I. He correctly identified Japan as a likely enemy and was instrumental in the development of amphibious capabilities that served as the foundation for the Pacific island-hopping campaign during World War II. In keeping with this example, Project Ellis is intended as an exploration of pivotal events or trends that would result in major changes to US national and military strategies. 3. Project Goal. The Project Ellis sponsor is the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. It is part of a multi-year effort to look beyond the current concepts and technologies what is sometimes referred to as the Next Marine Corps and begin the identification of future developments that would lead to a need to develop a Marine Corps After Next. The results of Project Ellis are presented to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratorys Innovation Advisory Counsel and are used to shape a variety of future concept development, wargaming, and experimentation efforts. 4. Project Design. Project Ellis is intended to explore the range of possibilities and, where possible, map the indicators that could mandate a change in direction for Marine Corps concepts. The following questions are representative of the approach in the first phase of Project Ellis: Are these in fact events or developments that would require a fundamental strategic change? (To include fundamental change in operating concepts, service roles and missions, force structure, and warfighting capabilities?) What events would provide advanced warning of these developments? Are there actions that the US can take to avert these developments? What would be the likely impact of these events upon US national and military strategies? How would these events impact the operational concepts of the joint staff, other services, and the Marine Corps? How would these developments impact the future Marine Corps? (The Marine Corps after the programmed force.) What kind of hedging actions could the US (or the Marine Corps) take to be better positioned to respond to these changes in the strategic landscape? 5. Assessment of the Critical Events Approach Less than half of the participants in Ellis 4 had participated in the other three Ellis events and therefore most were dependent upon the game reports and the summaries provided in Appendix A for background information. Most seemed to find the concept of pivotal events intriguing and the approach novel. However, the complexity of the issues and the supporting rationale defied simple presentation or consensus in interpreting the findings. The participants were comfortable with the concept of discontinuous change as a key characteristic of strategic surprise. If events follow existing trends, then there is by default little chance of strategic surprise. A third approach that attempts to discern the underlying causes of current trends -- in order to anticipate how those causal forces will shape the future was identified as well beyond the available assets for the Project Ellis. Accordingly, the concept of the identification of pivotal events and road signs to help in their recognition was supported as a logical means of assessing the risks in future visions. It was noted that this approach is similar to that used by the Office of Net Assessment in tracking potential revolutions in military affairs. Net Assessment focuses on specific categories of indicators. The intent is to provide indications of the emergence of radically different warfighting capabilities. The emphasis is on neither specific technology developments nor weapons systems. Neither is there interest in identifying concepts for simply improving existing military capabilities. Instead, they too are looking for fundamental changes that are exhibited in the creation of new warfare areas, new organizations, and the possibility of new competitive strategies that follow different warfare rules. Project Ellis did identify similar road signs of the pivotal events. However, the subsequent focus on hedging actions appeared to the participants as a piecemeal approach that inadequately incorporated tradeoffs. Most of the identified hedging actions occur within trade space between acceptable risk and comparative cost. For example, losses of military capability could be traded off through a reduction in strategic goals thereby keeping means and ends in balance. Likewise, changes in US demographics that decrease the pool of suitable volunteers for military service could be countered by a variety of responses. Compulsory national service (the draft), dramatically increased compensation to permit the military to compete directly with the civilian economy, or reductions in the size of the military force are only three of the alternatives. Each of these courses of action has associated economic, social, and strategic costs that must be balanced against the level of acceptable risk to the nation. To be complete, Project Ellis would have to expand its scope to assess the desirability of these tradeoffs. the participants considered the linear approach used in both separating the assumptions and critical events -- into discrete categories and the subsequent assessment of the potential hedging actions to be less than ideal. Critical events work in combination and defy straight line cause and effect analysis. In addition, critical events in one category impact events in others. For example, changes in the strategic landscape -- discussed in Ellis 1 -- also impact the complexion of coalitions and trade relationships discussed in Ellis 2. Similarly, the demographic changes in the US discussed in Ellis 2 would have an impact on the US foreign policy and military strategy that was discussed in Ellis 1. Likewise, the technology issues of Ellis 3 could impact both the strategic landscape and the US domestic environment. The US commercial information technology dominance affects the potential for trade blocks and non-inclusive coalitions. The explosion in biotechnology capabilities would affect US demographics in more than simply the resulting increase in life spans. It would likely add to the dichotomy between the haves and the have-nots and thus to the pressures for immigration from the developing to the developed nations. The complexity of the inter-relationships between the critical events was not adequately explored during this phase of Project Ellis. Some selective additional scenario wargaming efforts would be necessary to add detail. The preferred scenarios were those that explored the impact of the technology-based critical events. Concern was expressed in gaming scenarios that assume major changes in Marine Corps Roles and Functions in view of the anticipated quadrennial review in 2001. There were two exceptions to this concern. First, there seemed to be significant support to further exploration of how military forces specifically the Marine Corps can be used for Homeland Defense against terrorism. The Marine Corps has assumed a key role through the creation of CBIRF. There is also a perception that the historical distinction between national defense against foreign aggression and domestic security against terrorist disruptions may be increasingly less valid and therefore a good subject for further assessment. Second, was the potential for the Marine Corps to assume a greater role in the projection of decisive naval power. The potential for the Naval Service to assume this role was implicit in the CNOs Strategic Studies Group XVII Report of August 1998 and the follow-on efforts of Mr. James S. OBrasky and Steven E. Anderson under the project title of Tsunami 2050. Alternatively, developing this capability could be a response to emerging joint concepts such as Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) directed by the April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance. 6. Hedging Against the Loss of Information Dominance The participants were specifically concerned about the significance of information technologies to future US military concepts. Joint Vision 2010 and arguably Operational Maneuver From the Sea -- are dependent upon information dominance rather than superiority. Several questioned whether the US even has a robust state of strategic information dominance today outside dominant commercial IT market share. In the next twenty years, the US likely will enter a regime of competitive network centric warfare in which the realistic expectations should be limited to achieving information superiority. Concerns over future US ability to maintain assured, secure connectivity on the future battlefield against the kinds of technological threat discussed in Ellis 3 highlight this issue. There is a distinct difference between tactically actionable information and all the other forms of military information that constitutes battlespace knowledge. An intelligent enemy will attempt to deny the US the ability to take informed tactical action. Any battle management system has a finite display resolution. All actions taking place below this resolution represent clutter. An intelligent opponent with substantial resources will try to manage perceptions, raise display resolution to a level that will allow his own forces to operate effectively, and will introduce ambiguity into the operating picture. The US must expect that the networks upon which it depends will be interrupted for significant periods of time. These interruptions may be the result of either enemy information operations or technological breakthroughs as discussed in Ellis 3. (Attacks against US communications architecture in space, weapons effects similar to conventional EMP applied locally, or remote transmission of network viruses.) One hedging measure is to insist that our MAGTF components retain the organic ability to operate in the absence of the network services for a substantial but limited time. One participant termed this capability the ability to last the night. (In this case, the night could apply equally to both interruptions in network connectivity or physical separation of a landing force from the seabase caused by enemy attacks that drive the seabase farther off shore.) The C4 system capable of supporting this operational imperative has several major components: Sufficient situational awareness to recognize that the subject network has been or will be interrupted and why. A battle drill designed to conserve resources and avoid decisive combat while executing only the essential elements of the assigned mission by a tactically significant formation. Organic tactical situational awareness to allow the tactical units to posture for advantageous combat if necessary or to avoid combat if possible. Organic sustainment or logistical cache capable of supporting up to 18 hours of defensive combat against a superior but not overwhelming opponent. A practiced familiarity of operating in such a climate, well exercised, and well rehearsed. It is not something that should be sought, but skill and confidence in the ability to surmount this challenge is essential. This is not unlike efforts to operate under zero or limited emission control conditions (EMCON). One participant expanded on this issue. When two competitive battle management systems collide, there is an advantage in having a clear understanding of the enemy systems capability and vulnerabilities. Some features of one may be superior; others will be inferior. In engaging such a system, several approaches are possible. The system can be deceived. A deceived battle management system is by definition a battle mismanagement system. Or the enemy system can be countered so that its information is no longer tactically actionable, or it becomes useless to support decision making because of the loss of operator confidence in its information as a result of decoys and ambiguity. If two competitive battle management systems are allowed to control their forces unchallenged, then Lanchesters square applies, all other factors remaining equal. The one that attacks effectively first with sufficient numbers wins. In view of US dependence upon information technologies, few nations are likely to confront the US power projection capability without efforts to disrupt US networks. 7. Globalization and Coalitions Although isolation was listed as an alternative strategic hedging alternative to both domestic and strategic landscape challenges, the participants in Ellis 4 did not see merit in further assessment. Instead, the desirability of continued US involvement in coalitions due to fundamental global interests was reiterated as a continuing US imperative. However, as in Ellis 1, there was expectations that the nature of coalitions in the future would differ from those that have been characteristic of the Cold War. Flexible coalition structures that respond specifically to perceived threats to a common security interest replace standing coalitions formed to counter a common enemy. Flexible coalition structures require significantly different C4 architectures that gracefully add and delete partners with a wide variance in technological capability and access to classified networks. Technological improvements in voice-to-data and language translation will aid in coalition application. However, network security and the requirement for selective levels of access will constrain implementation of a common relevant operational picture that provides a consistent picture and situation representation to all coalition subscribers. These issues as well as concepts for more effective operational and tactical coalition decision making are candidate issues for Coalition Warrior. 8. Enabling versus Revolutionary Technologies There were few technology critical events that would signal strategic dislocations sufficient for a revolution. One participant to objected specifically to the idea of silver bullet technologies in the context of triggering strategic dislocations. Instead, the technological developments tend to be applied first to enabling capabilities for current concepts. Only when the technologies are used in the context of new organizations and new concepts of operations do they emerge as critical events triggering strategic change. Some exceptions do exist. The Soviet Unions demonstration of its nuclear capability well ahead of prognostications mandated changes in US strategy. Bio-engineered weapons could be signaled by a similar critical event. Likewise, the militarization of space by an inimical foreign power would be a critical strategic event. In both cases, the technologies that could support the critical event road sign of strategic change exist today in basic science. It is the application of these technologies into strategically significant capabilities that is important. One specific case that was discussed was the organization of current technologies into a viable anti-access capability. This issue was identified during Ellis 3 as a subject of a concerted study effort sponsored by OSD Net Assessment. (Item 10 in Appendix A refers.) Participants in Ellis 4 were skeptical as to whether this capability required any new technologies. Instead, this is an example of the competition in strategic capabilities. An anti-access regime is the response to the development of US power projection capabilities and is susceptible to a variety of competitive strategies such as: Deception that leads the builders of anti-access capabilities to invest in inappropriate or ineffective systems. Technology counters that make fielded systems obsolete (such as stealth to early warning radar) Changing concepts that eliminate previous vulnerabilities that anti-access capabilities were designed to attack. In contrast to either the anti-access strategy or the development of a new capability based on a single technology, sector advances in technology may have a more profound impact on future capabilities. For example, the emergence of micro-electromechanical devices (MEMs) that incorporate miniature sensors, transmitters, receivers, or actuators into broad commercial applications could signal such a significant sector development. These developments are based in part of the emergence of nanotechnologies as well as smaller, more efficient power sources. Taken together they herald a shift from bigger-is-better, to an era of miniaturization. This has both broad commercial and military implications: Vastly greater functionality in devices at a fraction of the size of those produced with conventional technology. Dramatic reductions in cost for the production of electronic equipment. Embedding of smart systems into virtually every tool or article to include clothing capable of a degree of adaptation as well as semi-autonomous functionality. Reductions in cube and square for future equipment of all kinds. Reductions in energy (fuel) requirements. Some of the results of this technological revolution are already apparent in embedded diagnostics in automobiles and other major end items of equipment. Future applications in unmanned autonomous and semi-autonomous systems could lead to a revolution in capabilities. Another example would result from improvements in vehicle propulsion. Specifically, the use of alternatives to fossil fuels that would eliminate or substantially reduce the consumption of -- the largest single sustainment item for military forces during power projection. Fuel cells and hybrid electric power are potentially alternative enabling technologies. Advancements in vehicle propulsion, coupled with initiatives to lighten and downsize vehicles could lead to revolutionary advances in mobility and sustainability of expeditionary forces. The downsizing could be the result of reduced requirements for payload due to the application of MEMs technology in on-board electronics. It could also result from reduced vehicle weight due to composite materials and alternative force protection systems to conventional armor. 9. Candidate Subjects for Further Assessment. The following specific issues from Ellis 1-3 were discussed as candidates for follow-on investigation. IssueEventCommentsA future Marine Corps organized to support rapidly employable, decisive seabased power projectionEllis 1--Equally a Navy as well as Marine Corps issue --Goes beyond current OMFTS/MPS 2010 concepts --Includes highly mobile, mounted MEB-size GCE and seabased ACEA future Marine Corps launched from the sea but then capable of operating without continuous support from the seabaseEllis 4--Equally a Navy as well as Marine Corps issue --In part a response to threat of interrupted network connectivity --Also reflects concern over anti-access capabilities that could threaten or interrupt effective seabase integration with forces ashoreA future Marine Corps organized for combat without dependence upon information superiority (dominance)Ellis 4--In part a response to the threat of information interruptions A future littoral expeditionary capability using a fully integrated NTF Ellis 4--Proposed during Ellis 4 with a view toward a combined future Navy/Marine Corps littoral concept exploration effort --Uses Hunter Warrior and Ring of Fire as a start pointA future Marine Corps organized around highly mobile forces employing light weight/alternative energy sourcesEllis 3--Builds on Chief of Staff of the Armys initiative for medium forces employing wheeled vehicles for increased mobility --Technology drivers are alternate fuel sources, weapons propellants and water generation (minimum sustainment requirements)A future Marine Corps organized around robotics and micro systems (to include nanotechnologies and MEMs) coupled with improved power sourcesEllis 3--Specifically considers explosion of unmanned systems --Includes organizational issues inherent in wide use of UAVs --Could lead to development of a highly mobile expeditionary force Several issues from Ellis 1-3 were identified as candidates for incorporation in future wargaming efforts although not specifically in supporting Project Ellis: Alternatives to forward basing (III MEF in Okinawa). Impact of reduced US social cohesion on military Roles and Missions. Impact of Universal National Service or reintroduction of the Draft. Coalitions where the US is not the dominant power (in charge). Note that this subject could be incorporated into Coalition Warrior advance wargaming. Technological and Values suitability of next generation Marines. 10. Observations and Recommendations The participants did not endorse any specific issue for follow-on exploration nor specific approach to the second phase of Project Ellis other than active coordination with similar Navy projects. There was support for continuing the project but not in pursuit of issues that impact specifically on current Marine Corps Title X Roles or DoD assigned Service Functions. Such an effort could be misconstrued and have unintended consequences. The issue of who the potential client or client(s) for Project Ellis or any other Marine Corps After Next (MCAN) conceptual exploration should be received considerable discussion. Due to Title X as well strategic concept implications, DC/S PP&O and HQMCs Strategic Initiatives Group have a special interest. In addition, MCCDC Concepts has staff cognizance of Marine Corps Concepts and MCCDC WDID has initiated an initiative to develop a systematic approach to examining the need for a MCAN. MARFORLANT in its role as the component commander for Joint Forces Command has a special interest in Marine Corps conceptual explorations that could impact the ongoing Joint Forces After Next wargaming effort. Project Ellis is recognized to be the only significant MCAN effort to date. All potential clients have been invited to participate and reports have been widely circulated. The number of Revolution in Military Affairs, future technology, and After Next wargaming efforts currently ongoing under the sponsorship of OSD and the various services was discussed as extremely ambitious. Many are repetitive. Overlapping of scheduling results in competition for participants. The issue is compounded because there is no central repository for cataloguing relevant insights (let alone epiphanies!) that could impact the MCAN effort. To be insightful, games and seminars need to be highly focused and involve subject matter experts that must be encouraged to provide their views in sufficient detail as to provide insight and increase knowledge on the subject. Several alternative courses of action were proposed for the second phase of Project Ellis: Adopt a similar approach to the RMA exploration of OSD Net Assessment by focusing on signs of revolutionary conceptual and organizational approaches that result in non-linear new capabilities Adopt a similar approach to the Army After Next (scenario based, technology path games) Focus on tracking outside gaming and concept efforts (JFAN, OSD Net Assessment sponsored RMA games, Service strategic concept games and extracting relevance to Marine Corps. Conduct MCAN red cell approach to operational level war games to assess possible deltas in performance as a result of changes in future capabilities. Adopt a case study development and critique process vice seminar war game format. The participants did not endorse any specific course of action. Instead, they focused on the importance of sharing insights and incorporation of the effort into the broader context of other OSD, Navy, and Marine Corps future exploratory efforts. APPENDIX A SUMMARIES Project Ellis began with a statement of base line assumptions that underpin current US strategic vision and future operational concepts. These assumptions were restated into specific developments for the purpose of discussion. Over the course of the first year of the project, these major developments underwent some revision based on the recommendations of participants in Project Ellis events. However, the basic thrust remained consistent. The only exception is the addition of the last development the emergence of effective anti-access capabilities that was added as a result of the recommendation of a number of participants during Ellis 3. Project Ellis Base Line Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10 Nine Developments That Would Lead to a Major Change in US Security/Military Strategy . . . Page 11 Strategic Landscape Development 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12 Strategic Landscape Development 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 Strategic Landscape Development 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 Strategic Domestic Landscape Development 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 Strategic Domestic Landscape Development 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 Strategic Domestic Landscape Development 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17 Strategic Domestic Landscape Development 6A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 18 Technology Developments 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19 Technology Developments 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20 Technology Developments 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21 Technology Developments 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 22 PROJECT ELLIS BASE LINE ASSUMPTIONS Strategic Landscape: That the predominant threat to the US will continue to be nation states since only a state has the resources to mount a credible threat. That the US will continue to remain engage in world security affairs through a combination of forward presence and forward based forces. That the US will continue to pursue a coalition security strategy. Domestic Character: That a sufficient number of suitable Americans will be available for future military service. That the US will continue to be a nation of traditional American values and seek to promote these values through global engagement. That American society will remain cohesive, characterized by shared national identity. Technology: That the US will continue to maintain information technology leadership in the world that can translate into military information dominance in future military operations. That information technologies and precision weapons will continue to be the focus of military innovation. That the US will be able to maintain technological superiority sufficient to prevent any emergence of a peer competitor. 17 May 1999 Nine Developments That Would Lead to a Major Change in US Security/Military Strategy Foreign Policy The major threat to US interests becomes non-nation states. This threat is posed either through transnational organizations with paramilitary arms or violent "warrior" individuals or groups within nations that no longer maintain internal order. [Transformation of principal threat from inter-state war to that of violent individuals or groups without moral restraints of nation-state politics] The US eliminates its forward-based military forces in Europe and the Western Pacific. [US no longer has the leverage of forward-based forces to practice engagement and support coalition security agreements.] The US rejects the unilateral use of force in overseas interventions and instead depends on international organizations in which the US is a member but not necessarily the leader to secure US overseas interests. [OpCon of US peacetime presence military forces assumed by international organizations.] Social The US homeland is not a sanctuary in international conflicts. [US territory is no longer inviolate due to open borders and proliferation of WMD available to both nation states and transnational organizations.] The demand for technically proficient Marines outstrips the supply of technically educated, physically fit males within the recruiting pool. [Not every Marine technician is necessarily also able to be a rifleman .] Diversity and multi-lingual society emerge as major characteristics of America. Diversity leads to ethnic separatism and/or the emergence of near autonomous regions within states that are increasingly alienated from the values and shared American identity. [Problems in governance, recruiting, and popular support of national policies.] Technology The US loses its world leadership in Information Technologies, either through the emergence of breakthrough technologies by foreign governments or the emergence of non-US lead multinational companies that are so dominant in their IT sector that they can establish world standards and the direction of world IT development. [US loses most significant military technology edge.] Revolutionary bio or nanotechnologies emerge that make conventional weapon systems based on physics and chemistry obsolete. [US precision weapons and conventional power projection less relevant.] Revolutionary technology emerges that permits near 100 percent interruption of electro-magnetic communications over broad local areas. (Conventional EMP?) [IT connectivity that underpins US military dominance and JV2010 interpretation of the RMA eliminated.] Note: Emergence of a near-peer competitor is recognized as an event that would lead to a major review of strategy and policy. However, this issue is considered elsewhere and therefore not an issue of this project. STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 1 Pivotal Event or Development: Transformation of the threat from nation states to non-state warriors or transnational organizations. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Few nations have capability to emerge as peer competitor. Some may use surrogates or resort to asymmetric warfare using terrorist acts. Greater threat is that of dysfunctional states that cannot control disaffected populations (warriors). Without nation states to self-police, it is more likely to result in many more non-conventional threats (terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental issues, humanitarian relief to dysfunctional states, et al) Nation states have targetable infrastructure centers of gravity. Non-state actors present greater complexity in their centers of gravity; some may not be militarily targetable. Non-nation state conflicts are longer in duration and less subject to resolution by discrete military action.  Trends: Conflicts have one or more non-state belligerent. Increase in the number of dysfunctional states Key nation states form coalitions to deal with non-state warrior threats. Events: WMD terrorist attack on US  Options: 1. Isolationism./Fortress America 2. Expand US role in international organizations in order to respond to causes of conflict. Globalism. Implement a low-end RMA with an emphasis on improving the survivability and capability of conventional forces operating in a dispersed manner in urban areas Reassess the division between Defense and Law Enforcement in responding to assymetrical attacks on the US. Supporting Actions: --Additional focus on interagency cooperation and organization --Two tier strategy recognizing need to deal with nation states and non-state threats. --Develop force structures specifically for nation building Joint: --Greater need for regional expertise in operational staffs. --SOF for counter terrorism and nation building. Agencies: --Intel: Greater emphasis on HUMINT and Communications interception less on --Interagency cooperation to deal with non-military aspects of conflict --Redefinition of posse comitatus/ military role in supporting domestic agencies in Homeland Defense (response to terrorism) Army and National Guard: --Homeland Defense becomes critical mission that could become either the focus of the Guard. --Rapidly deployable, sustainable forces for long term peacekeeping functions. Air Force: --Reduced threat of peer competitor. --Greater emphasis on space/strategic lift. Navy: --Reduced threat of peer competitor. --Greater needs to focus on SLOC control, strategic lift, and providing a secure seabase. Marine Corps: --Of services probably best oriented to cope with change in threat --Plan for support to homeland defense with tailored capabilities (CBIRF). Wargaming & Experimentation --Include non-state warriors routinely in future wargame scenarios --Expand efforts to include NGOs and agencies as wargame participants --Consider Roles and Missions implications both of the issue of Homeland Defense and expanded requirements for Peacekeeping/Nation Building forces Training & Education --Focus PME on historical case studies and unconventional threats --More FAOs and emphasis on cultural intelligence --More inter agency exercises New Capabilities --Scalable weapon effects/non-lethal weapons --Rapidly deployable infrastructure support systems (restore utilities, water purification, etc.)Bottom line assessment: --USMC already well positioned --Potential for R&M realignment Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: Include warrior threat and dysfunctional states in future Wargame scenarios STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 2 Pivotal Event or Development: US no longer maintain a land-based presence in Europe in the Western Pacific in Korea and Japan. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Reflects revision in coalitions perception of threat. Residual coalitions are unlikely to accede to US political or military leadership. Likely to result in regional security coalitions focused on specific threats (piracy, migration, drug trafficking, smuggling, anti-terrorism, et al) Loss of bases reflects a strategic mobility problem: --current lift is inadequate to support power projection absent residual support agreements in the region --increases time requirements for regional deployments. Greatest impact would occur if loss of bases occurred without warning. Trends: --Host nation restrictions on US military activities from overseas bases. --Host nation calls for reductions in force or reduced subsidization. --Regional security arrangements involving US allies emerge without US as dominant partner. Events: --Japan revokes treaty --China /Japan establish regional security arrangements without the US as a partner. --NATO is disbanded; WEU-like organization replaces it without the US as a military member. --Establishment of standing international security forces under auspices of international organizations 1. Isolationism/Fortress America --Western Hemisphere refocus 2. Globalism --Broaden coalitions --Expand support agreements (logistics, bed down, port access, etc.) 3. Provide Forces to Multi-National Commands 4. Expeditionary Force Structure --Joint forces --US-based forces with strategic lift --Fight as they arrive Joint: --Consolidate Regional CINCs? --Focus on power projection from CONUS? --Focus on space-based systems? --US forces under coalition command? Agencies: --I&W critical Army: --Require a lighter more mobile Army --Reduced logistics tail imperative Air Force: --Long range strike imperative --AEF required to replace forward bases Navy: --SLOC control essential --Protection of seabasing critical (to counter anti-access strategies) --Opportunity for seabased force ascendancy Marine Corps: --Need alternative basing for III MEF --Could be excuse to eliminate structure --Opportunity for seabased force ascendancy  Wargaming & Experimentation --Alternative basing options for III MEF --Seabasing options (MOB, MPF 2010, etc.) --Alternative coalition command structures Training & Education --Coalition operations New Capabilities --Seabase decisive naval forces (MEF vice MEU) --At sea marryup of MAGTF at a seabase independent of host nation support --Reduced logistics footprint --Flexible C4 system for adaptation to coalition operations --Fast sealift to provide mobility of the seabase from CONUS anywhere in the world Bottom line assessment: --Expanded Seabasing is one strategic alternative --Increased demand for decisive expeditionary force (could be naval or joint) --Need alternate basing options for III MEF Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: --Assume no regional basing in wargame scenarios --Focus on means of rapidly projecting decisive seabased force Is MPF 2010 realizable for the Next Marine Corps or is it within MCAN? STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 3 Pivotal Event or Development: The US rejects the unilateral use of force in overseas interventions and instead depends upon international organizations in which the US is a member, but not necessarily the leader, to secure US overseas interests. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Flexible C4 structures that can adapt to coalition architectures. Emphasizes forces that are adaptable and easily assimilated into coalition forces. Places greater emphasis on decision making by military officers who are executing coalition operations consistent with US policy.  Trends: --Formation of coalitions with combined force structures in which the US is not the dominant nation. Events: --Establishment of standing UN military/peacekeeping forces. --OPCON of US military forces assumed by international organizations. --US policy change on unilateral use of force.  Development of two-tier military force structure with one for defense of the US against attack and a second one for assignment to coalition forces. Reduction of military standing forces that are not essential to homeland defense or readily usable in coalition forces. Develop force structures specifically for nation building.  Joint: --Increased focus on coalition doctrine --Refine doctrine for coalition operations involving US forces operating under coalition command. --Two tiered command structure could emerge to deal with homeland defense separate from coalition support. Agencies: --UN Military Office gains near CINC importance --Need flexible Intel sharing system with coalition partners while preserving necessary firewalls. Army: --Army/National Guard division of homeland defense mission --Prospective Medium Army Brigade structure well suited for coalition missions. Air Force: --Capabilities should remain in demand Navy: --Likely to be key coalition partner; US Navy only true blue-water Navy for SLOC protection Marine Corps: --Expeditionary mission means coalition interoperability  Wargaming & Experimentation --Consider key aspects as part of Coalition Warrior gaming --Emphasize coalition C4 with a specific emphasis on coalition decision-making Training & Education --Coalition PME --Coalition staff organization and functionality New Capabilities --Language translation technology --Multilevel security C2 decision support systems for coalition operations --C4 architecture capable of distributing the Common Tactical Picture for US forces involved in a coalition operation not only within the battlespace but globally if desired. --Development of a C4 architecture that gracefully accommodates a varying degree of technological sophistication by coalition partners.Bottom line assessment: -- US military forces already routinely operate as part of coalitions (NATO Kosovo the latest example). Issue is fundamentally a policy issue; capability requirements for future Marine Corps coalition operations will be developed as part of Coalition Warrior.Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- incorporate into Coalition Warrior wargaming as a scenario excursion DOMESTIC LANDSCAPE -- 4 Pivotal Event or Development: US demographics no longer supply adequate numbers of suitable military recruits. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Envisioned concepts require future military recruits to meet a high standard: --Technologically proficient --English speaking high school graduates --Primary identification as Americans (before identification with a regional, ethnic, or religions affiliation) --Traditional Values (self-sacrifice, patriotism, work ethic, personal honor, etc.) --Initiative and individuality Future concepts with emphasis on information technologies, precision strike, and dispersed operations assume availability of military personnel capable of executing the concepts with greater independence and at a higher tempo than current concepts. Trends: --Education performance of Americans students. --Number of Americans speaking other than English as primary language --Attitudinal changes of the American population (National identification, civic interest, national service, military service, etc.) --Ability of military services to meet recruiting goals (to include quality targets) Events: --Military services reduce enlistment standards  Option 1: reinstitute the draft (could be part of institution of national service) Option 2: increase compensation for the military (mercenaries?) Option 3: downsize and increase the professionalism to reduce manpower requirement Hedging actions: --add basic education programs for substandard recruits --add language programs for non-English speakers --institute bilingual units? --dumb down the equipment the military uses  Joint: --draft would result in increase in first term military members --smaller military most likely to lead to deemphasis on manpower intensive functions (infantry) --reduced options for manpower intensive strategic options (peacekeeping, presence, urban operations) Agencies: NA Army: --has greatest impact due to largest demand for recruits --lead to smaller battalions/organizations Air Force: --could increase focus on privatizing maintenance and airfield support --could reinforce emphasis on unmanned systems with reduced maintenance and support requirements Navy: --reinforce need to reduce crews and privatize support establishment Marine Corps: --increased competition for recruit cohort with propensity to become Marines --greater difficulty implementing concepts emphasizing strategic corporals  Wargaming & Experimentation --impact of the draft on Marine Corps personnel policies Training & Education --draft would lead to expanded recruit training throughput --English language and basic skills training add to T2P2 --expanded need for institutional ization and values training New Capabilities --greater emphasis on appliances with built-in technology that is simple to use for military functions --equipment with built-in diagnostics and system alerts (either to operator or within a remote monitoring system) --communication devices that include built in language translators Bottom line assessment: -- education and technology proficiency may not be as significant as values in future population. Impacts recruiting as well as military effectiveness in combat. Language appears to more significant as a values indicator national identification -- than a training issue.Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- Incorporate values and national service into future war game scenarios DOMESTIC LANDSCAPE 5 Pivotal Event or Development: Diversity and a multi-lingual society emerge as major characteristics of America with an increasing proportion of the population lacking traditional values and sense of a shared American identity. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Historically, immigrants have rapidly learned English and sought to adopt American values. Many continued to have pride in ethnic origins but valued American citizenship and identification. Immigrants have often been most patriotic of all Americans to include volunteering for military service. Historically, ethnic enclaves have been norm within the US; within two generations most immigrants have adopted English as the primary language and entered US society. This phenomena is not norm worldwide; ethnic divisions often lead to separatism or at least reduced association with national politics in favor of locate civic interests. Trends: --Rate new immigrants learn English (currently most rapid in history) --Rate new immigrants seek citizenship. --Identification of US residents as Americans versus other classifications on ethnic or language grounds. Events: --Local or state adoption of another language than English as the official language  Possibility 1: Isolationism (reflecting a lack of popular solidarity in support of US foreign policy) Possibility 2: Regional US military organizations reflecting local ethnic predominance and perhaps even languages. Possibility 3: Greater focus of US military on internal security (National Guard) and a reduced interest in a military designed to protect US interests worldwide. Possibility 4: US military forces decreasingly reflect the language and ethnic makeup of the general US population.  Joint: More difficult to educate the American public on US strategic interests and strategy. Agencies: NA Army: National Guard may increase its importance at expense of Army. Services: --focus on developing smaller, more professional forces in recognition of difficulties in manning a large standing military structure. --greater difficulty in recruiting and training. --more emphasis on recruit institutionalization to specifically include values training --language training incorporated into training cycle with impact on T2P2  Wargaming & Experimentation Training & Education --develop expanded training programs focused on values training (going beyond the current core values program) as part of recruit training New Capabilities --language translator technology for communications --embedded training within systems (systems train their operators)Bottom line assessment: -- trend lines do not currently indicate any impact on US capabilities within the next 20 years. Marine Corps in particular successfully recruits from largest immigrant group (Latin Americans). Language assimilation appears to be faster than any time in our history. Current political trends are countering bilingual education. Current poles and social models imply next generation of Americans may have better values than the current recruit cohorts.Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- None at this time DOMESTIC LANDSCAPE 6 Pivotal Event or Development: The US homeland is no longer a sanctuary in international conflicts. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Conflicts can no longer be regionally isolated. US intervention anywhere in the world places the US homeland at risk. Military force deployments cannot assume secure ALOCs and LOCs to regions of US interest during a conflict.  Trends: --proliferation of WMD and/or long range ballistic missiles expands beyond rogue nations and into non-national organizations Events: --terrorism or unconventional strikes against the US in response to US international policies or actions  Alternative 1: Isolationism. Alternative 2: Homeland defense focus for US military Alternative 3: Increased interagency approach to homeland defense including a role for the military Joint: Deliberate planning for regional contingencies must include homeland defense Agencies: Interagency cooperation key to homeland defense issues Army: --DOMS could be replaced by USACOM or other JFC to better respond to Homeland Defense imperative. --Army or National Guard organizes for Homeland Defense response mission Air Force: --air and ballistic missile defense mission Navy: --increased cooperation with Coast Guard in port security mission Marine Corps: --force protection for US bases assumes greater importance  Wargaming & Experimentation --add homeland defense issues to wargame scenarios Training & Education --force security New Capabilities --remote detection of WMD agents (specifically explosives as well as NBC agents that could be used as weapons against rear areas or US facilities) --Base and station C4 system that integrates into national Homeland Defense interagency systems Bottom line assessment: -- This is not a new issue for US planning dating back to the Cold War concerns about SPETSNAZ and Soviet efforts to slow or halt US global deployments from US ports in the event of conflict. -- Current Chinese writings refer to attacks on the US homeland as an effort to strike at US political will. Counter-proliferation efforts particularly remote WMD detection are defenses against this threat.Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: Include Homeland Defense issues in wargames with a special emphasis on securing APODs and PODs for initial deployments of early intervention forces Expand Force Protection capabilities to include applications for rear areas and US military facilities.  DOMESTIC LANDSCAPE 6A Pivotal Event or Development: The US Balkanizes into ethnic dominated regions that include regions with strong ties to other nations based on common language or heritage by the majority of US residents. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Reduced sense of shared values and cohesion behind national policies. US foreign policy impacted by public opinion in specific regions with foreign heritages. Immigration and security of US borders to illegal entry likely to assume greater importance. Reduced propensity for national/military service.  Trends: --growth in separatist movements within the US --development of cooperative economic and political  Alternative 1: Isolationism. Alternative 2: Homeland defense focus for US military with particular emphasis on border protection. Alternative 3: Regionalization of military forces (by language and dominant ethnic group)  Joint: --Locations of military bases assume greater significance due to potential regional opposition to US policies on the use of military forces. --Planning for regional contingencies must include homeland defense --Greater imperative to resolve conflicts rapidly due to likely policy fractions within US public support Army: --DOMS could be replaced by USACOM or other JFC to better respond to Homeland Defense (internal security) imperative. --Army or National Guard organizes for Homeland Defense response mission (probably with a regional approach) Air Force: NA Navy: --increased integration with Coast Guard in border/access control missions Marine Corps: --could become US expeditionary force with Army assuming greater Homeland Defense role  Wargaming & Experimentation --homeland defense scenarios incorporate potential for regional ethnicism. Training & Education --cultural sensitivity and language training New Capabilities --non-lethal wide area denial systems Bottom line assessment: -- Ramifications of this scenario are broadly based across all aspects of the US, to include politics, economics, demographics, and national culture. The impact on US strategic vision and military strategy is incalculable due to other factors such as the international strategic landscape (character of the threat). Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: None at this time  TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS 7 Pivotal Event or Development: The US loses its world leadership in Information Technologies. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions US world IT commercial dominance has fueled US economic growth and provided US with strategic IT lead. Moores law assumes rapid commercial application of IT developments. IT innovation is principally commercially funded and directed. Major companies are transnational. Information dominance gained by US IT is a foundation assumption of current warfighting concepts. Commercial application of space-based systems provides what previously was exclusively an information source for world powers on the open market (1-meter resolution on two-hour delay). US precision weapons, investment in stealth technologies, and strategic emphasis on long range strike is based on ability to maintain information dominance. Integration of joint capabilities requires assured communication and information processing.  Trends: --Foreign commercial companies assume market leadership in selected IT niches --Introduction of foreign satellite constellations (communications, GPS, sensors, etc.) --Foreign software operating systems rival US systems in world market --Potential enemy militaries adopt organizations and concepts that employ networks and IT to specifically counter US operating concepts. Events: --US secure metworks are penetrated --Major US antagonists demonstrate ability to field networked RSTA systems that support anti-access capabilities. --Attack on US space-based systems  Separate strategic IT architecture from dependency upon the commercial IT architecture. (This reduces risk of foreign interruption as well as policy issues in targeting C4 architectures and specifically satellite constellations.) Develop safeguards that limit vulnerability of US networks to attack. Strategy and operational concepts could stress superiority in other warfighting areas. Technology is not as significant in developing military capabilities as implementing concepts and organizations. Therefore, could focus on adapting IT into new organizations faster than other militaries.  Joint: --Undermines JV2010 --Reduces likelihood of casualty-less combat --Tempo increases in importance in order to take advantage of opportunities before enemy can take advantage of his information systems. Agencies: --Greater focus on interagency approach to IW (counter better IT with better organizational counters) --Information protection for US secure networks --Collected intelligence requires more rapid dissemination Army: --Greater focus on maneuver, deception, and signature control on forces. Air Force: --Unmanned systems assume greater importance due to increased risk of detection and networked countermeasures. Navy and Marine Corps: --Increased threat to the seabase --Greater emphasis on signature control of all Navy and support ships --Development of counter surveillance and targeting concepts  Wargaming & Experimentation --assume selected IT parity in wargame scenarios --continue to focus on improving opportunistic small unit leader decision making (increase tempo and reduce dependence on C4 architecture) Training & Education --eliminate assumed technology superiority in surrogate opposing forces --develop surrogate OPFOR with state of the shelf IT characteristics in training. --develop concepts and train to accomplish missions during period of EMCON and data isolation New Capabilities --signature reduction on vehicles and platforms --deception and signature masking for ship-to-shore movement --low observable tactical UAVs Bottom line assessment: -- State-of-the art IT is available commercially on the world market. Unlikely US will be able to limit military application of commercially developed and available IT. US military applications typically lag state of commercial shelf. Niche IT parity should be assumed in future concepts. Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- Include IT parity in future wargaming scenarios -- Look for alternative operational concepts and organizational theories that are less dependent upon IT dominance  TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS 8 Pivotal Event or Development: Revolutionary technology emerges that permits near 100 percent interruption of electro-magnetic communications over broad local areas. (Conventional EMP?) SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Would provide the means to selectively interrupt US information networks. Could provide means to isolate maneuver units on the battlefield from supporting arms, logistics, and enemy intelligence critical for force protection. Potentially a silver bullet aimed at information-based organizations and concepts (JV 2010). Could have lasting effect if effects damaged system components in addition to interrupting communications.  Trends: --precisely tuned jamming demonstrated as a part of military IW capabilities. --organizational changes in foreign militaries that focus on IW forces with extensive jamming --wide deployment of advanced RF weapons as components of offensive IW organizations Events: --testing of beam riding viruses capable of being remotely inserted into systems through sensor feeds.  Hardening of military systems (adding cost and slowing fielding of state-of-the-shelf technologies) Develop force structures specifically for nation building.  Joint: --hardening of critical C4 architectures --EMP resistant redundancy (fiber optic cable, lasers, etc. Services: --adoption of concepts that accept interruptions in C2 without paralyzing initiative --less dependence upon off-platform sensors --less dependence upon remote fires for force protection or integrated with maneuver --greater redundancy in C2 connectivity to maneuver elements Marine Corps: --continuing to organize maneuver elements with organic fires --employment of non-participatory position reporting in support of the CTP Wargaming & Experimentation -- include capability in war game scenarios -- test implications of experimental concepts when system connectivity is interrupted. Training & Education -- train with periods of EMCON/no electronic connectivity during key periods of maneuver and contact -- exercise-operating procedures in the absence of electronic connectivity and computer assisted decision making. New Capabilities -- self repairing computer systems -- system elf diagnostic alerts that warn of virus penetration of system as well as losses of connectivity with stations/nodes on the network -- backup systems that are not EMP-affected waveforms (lasers?) Bottom line assessment: -- RF warheads exist today that can cause near EMP effects on unhardened electronic systems. Broad area effects appear to have technological limitations. Broad band jamming is possible but produces unmaskable signatures for attack. Greater risk could be from remotely transferable computer viruses and other IW threats that could result in the same effect of interrupt networks and automated system functionality.Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- Pursue as part of C4 protection issue. -- Focus on concepts that provide robust backup capability or promote self-healing systems. -- Red team future concepts to ensure they are not dependent upon assured connectivity  TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS 9 Pivotal Event or Development: Revolutionary biological or nano-technologies emerge that make conventional weapon systems based on physics and chemistry obsolete. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions Current military concepts are typically physics based: focused on acquiring targets at limits of sensing capabilities and then projecting precision-delivered weapons effects against targets. Biotechnology could offer both alternative weapon systems and prophylaxis against disease. Biological vectors can be used to deliver nano-technology based sensors. Biological agents could enhance individual performance. Biological manufacturing could produce (grow energy sources, blood replacement, simple circuits) Nano-technologies could reduce requirements for power for similar functionality. Development of room-temperature super conductors would revolutionize power sources when coupled with nano-technology.  Trends: --World acceptance of genetic engineered biological agents. --Commercial application of nano-technologies. Events: --Demonstration of biological prophylaxis involving genetic engineered emulsions. --Demonstration of room-temperature super conduction --Demonstration of closed system power sources (self-generation based on biological agents to grow micro-wattage energy) Adding biotech to counter proliferation international regimes in an effort to limit biotech research (specifically gene splicing). Encourage US commercial development of biotech to maintain US dominance of developments. Invest in nano-tech research specifically in conjunction with alternative power sources Focus concept development on implications of miniaturization: --Embedded microprocessors in mechanical systems as well as technical systems --LPD scatterable sensors --Low power consumption permitting long term employment between refueling  Joint: --Could result in a refocus on decentralization --Miniaturization and employment of biotech to grow fuel and in self-healing applications reduces demands on central support structures. Makes forward forces more self-sufficient. Agencies: --Potential additional intelligence collection means Services: --Greater capability from unmanned systems --Reduced size of key military systems Marine Corps: --biotech performance enhancers and prophylaxis against biological agents/disease would specifically enhance short-term tactical tempo and reduce losses in urban operations due to disease. --Nano-tech + power sources provides immediate capability to enable the RSTA Cloud concept --Also application in miniature (short range, tactical) UGVs and UAVs Wargaming & Experimentation --include extensive unmanned systems in future wargaming scenarios (on both sides) --expand experimentation in use of robotics and micro-vehicles Training & Education: NA New Capabilities --Smaller, more capable weapons and systems due to miniaturization and reduced power consumption. --High density, light-weight power sources would be a key enabler for expeditionary forces Bottom line assessment: -- Strategic surprise is more likely in biotech and nano-technology development than in any other area of scientific research. Unclear whether sliver bullets will revolutionize capabilities and concepts or serve to enable implementation of concepts. Circuit miniaturization and application of microprocessors is related field with similar high payoff in future high tech appliances.Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- Focus conceptual development on the impact of lightweight power sources and systems with dramatically reduced power consumption through miniaturization. -- Broaden examination of robotics and unmanned systems -- Explore potential augmentation available to the individual Marine through embedding microprocessors and decision support systems in equipment and biotech applications TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS 10 Pivotal Event or Development: long range targeting systems coupled with precision weapon systems permits most potential US belligerent states to conduct a counter access strategy. SignificanceI&WUS Strategic Response OptionsImpact on Concepts & CapabilitiesUSMC Hedging Actions This capability threatens: --US forward based/presence forces and ability to project expeditionary forces --The seabase and ability to close sufficiently to conduct OMFTS Limits initial US military options to essentially long-range strike Loss of synchronization of land, sea, and air power projection  Trends: --fielding of long range RSTA capabilities tracking US forward presence forces --long range cruise and ballistic missiles with precision delivery capabilities (<100m) --fielding of space based open ocean sensor systems --development of hypervelocity weapons for anti-ship role --organizing military forces for anti-access mission linking detection and engagement forces within single organization Events: --demonstration of hyperspectral sensors capable of tuning to specific material detection --commercially available space based products that provide means of tracking US seabased forces  Signature control and application of active stealth systems to power projection platforms Operational focus on counter RSTA requirements Phased approach to power projection requiring reduction of anti-access capability through strike and IW attack before power projection. Development of a capability in all power projection forces to last the night due to intermittent interruptions in connectivity.  Joint/Agencies: --advance force operations needed to defeat anti-access capabilities --targeting the anti-access systems priority EEI Army: --similar problem to Naval Forces --power projection of early arriving forces can occur only after elimination of anti-access capability Air Force: --key role in long range strike and space systems to defeat RSTA and anti-access systems --reduced viability of AEF for early entry (assume 1500km range on anti-access missiles) Navy: --forward presence forces at risk of preemptive strike --seabases at risk until RSTA/anti-access capabilities defeated --once safe to establish seabase also safe to project land based forces so reduces seabase advantage Marine Corps: --forward presence forces at risk Wargaming & Experimentation --explore potential for advance force operations launched covertly and unsupported from the seabase after insertion --mobile operations against a robust tactical RSTA capability --assess means of conducting OMFTS/STOM with interruptions in seabased support (landing force self-sufficiency) Training & Education --train against OPFOR with RSTA parity --greater emphasis on deception and counter surveillance New Capabilities --LO ship-to- shore platforms --counter RSTA systems for the landing force --mobile forces with reduced logistics dependence on the seabase Bottom line assessment: -- OMFTS/STOM assumes relatively secure seabase. Recommendation for future MCAN efforts: -- Incorporate anti-access capabilities in wargame scenarios -- Explore concepts with interruptions in seabased support for forces ashore --Explore alternatives that extend the range off shore for the seabase APPENDIX B PARTICIPANTS Dr. Frank Shoup Captain Ken Beeks, USN OPNAV--N85 DoN OMITS shoup.francis@hq.navy.mil beeks.ken@hq.navy.mil Mr. Jim OBrasky Colonel John H. Turner, USMC NSWC, Dahlgren MCWAR obraskyjs@nswc.navy.mil turnerjh@mcu.usmc.mil Dr. Gary Horne Lieutenant Colonel Noel Williams, USMC CNAMCCDC PP&O SIG hornege@mccdc.usmc.mil williamsjn@hqmc.usmc.mil Mr. Bill Scheffler Lieutenant Colonel Mike Haas, USMC Tech Div (Avn)MCWL Info TechMCU schefflerw@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil haasms@mcu.usmc.mil Mr. Gary Setti Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lukeman, USMC Tech SearchMCWL S&TR StrategyOSD settig@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil lukemanj@osd.pentagon.mil Major Buck Plunket, USMC Major G. E. Hartway, USMC DoN OMIT Concepts DivMCCDC plunkett.buck@hq.navy.mil hartwayge@mccdc.usmc.mil Major J. Scott OMeara, USMC Major John Sumner, USMC JFCOM WargamingMCWL omeara@jfcom.mil sumnerj@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil Mr. James A. Lasswell GAMA Corporation lasswellj@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil  The United States Commission on National Security on National Securitys phase I report on the emerging global security environment for the first quarter of the 21st century, titled New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century (dated 15 September 1999) takes this approach to assessing strategic challenges in the next century.  Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XVII, Naval Warfare Innovation Concept Team Reports, dated August 1998.  James S. OBrasky and Steven E. Anderson, Tsunami2050: A Naval Operational Concept and Force Design for the 21st Century, unpublished manuscript delivered as a brief during Ellis 1.  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