ࡱ>      Yc WjbjbSS 11!]  FFF$P AZb"***x H  YZZZZZZ,[],ZF  ^x ,ZX**XXX 8*F*Yj\ YXX4BV`.FYTԎY\STRATEGIC SURPRISE SEMINAR (PROJECT ELLIS, GAME NUMBER 1) 20-21 April 1999    Sponsored by: Wargaming Division Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory Quantico, VA 22134-5069   5205 Leesburg Pike Falls Church, VA 22041 703-578-1700 Fax: 703-578-1704 www.gamacorp.com Strategic Surprise Seminar (Project Ellis Game Number 1) 20-21 April 1999 1. Introduction. Project Ellis Game Number One was the first of four seminar war games on the subject of strategic surprise. The project was named for Major Pete Ellis -- who was instrumental in shaping the amphibious doctrine that was the foundation for the Pacific island-hopping campaign during World War II. It is intended as an exploration of pivotal events in the strategic landscape that would result in a major change to the US national and military strategies. The initial four game series is the first of a two-phase effort. In the first phase, the focus is on the identification of events that would lead to changes to the assumptions that are the basis for the US strategic vision of the future. The focus of the second phase is the impact of those changes on the roles and functions of the Marine Corps as a contributor of military capabilities, how the Marine Corps can prepare to respond to change, and the exploration of alternative operational concepts. 2. The Problem. Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) are operational concepts for employing Marine Corps sea-based capabilities in the anticipated world strategic environment consistent with Joint Vision 2010. The Marine Corps program -- that includes fielding the MV-22 and AAAV -- is aimed at providing the capabilities in the "next Marine Corps" to implement these operational concepts. But what if the strategic landscape changes? What events would necessitate a fundamental change to Joint Vision 2010 and a need for the Marine Corps to move beyond OMFTS/STOM as an operational concept? This project is intended to explore the range of possibilities and, where possible, map the indicators that would mandate change in direction. The following questions are representative of those asked in each seminar: --Are these in fact events or developments that would require a fundamental strategic change? --What events would provide advanced warning of these developments? --Are there actions that the US can use to avert these changes? --What kind of hedging actions could the US take to be in the best position to respond to changes in the strategic landscape? --What would be the likely impact of these events upon US strategic and military strategies? --How would these developments impact the Marine Corps? What hedging actions could the Marine Corps take to be in position to respond to the resulting change in the strategic landscape? Focus of the First Seminar. This first seminar focused on the issue of our strategy of engagement through forward-based forces. Specifically, the first seminar explored the following issues. --What if the principal threat is no longer nation states but rather non-state "warriors" or transnational organizations? --What if the US no longer maintains a land-based presence in Europe as a part of NATO or in the Western Pacific in Korea and Japan? --What if the US voluntarily renounces its right to unilateral use of force and instead deploys its military forces exclusively as part of multinational forces under the auspices of international organizations in which the US is a member but not necessarily the leader? Strategic Surprise For the purpose of this seminar game series, strategic surprise is defined in terms of changes in the strategic landscape that create the need to revise the assumptions that underpin US military strategy. In this case, "military strategy" is defined in broad terms with both a vision of future military goals and objectives, as well as the organization, doctrine, and capabilities needed to implement the vision. The strategic surprise need not result from a totally unexpected event. Rather, it could be a development over time that is: --Not recognized and therefore not acted upon. --Recognized but the ability to act upon it is culturally or politically impossible. --Recognized but interpreted incorrectly. Strategic surprise has numerous historical precedents. In 1900, Norman Angell, predicted that war between the major industrial states was becoming increasingly impossible for both political and economic reasons. One reason cited was globalization. (In terms of value of international trade as a percentage of world GNP, the world did not meet the 1913 standard until the late 1990s.) Yet, by 1917 the world was at war. A second example was 1930 Britain. From a British viewpoint, the strategic landscape was relatively benign marked only by a belligerent Soviet Union. The Japanese were friendly, Germany was sinking into an economic depression, Italy was aggressive in North Africa yet appeared reasonable. Five years later, the landscape was changed radically in each case with British strategic interests seemingly at risk everywhere. The latter case highlights the significant impact of discontinuity in history. Rarely are there linear trends. Downturns in world economies exacerbate political instability and not only increase competition between nation states, they lead to population disruptions. At the same time, the rise of powerful nationalists such as Hitler, or social revolutions that lead to the rise of a Napoleon or a Stalin remain unpredictable. Confident nations that feel technologically superior are among the most likely to be strategically surprised. They tend to ignore warnings and misinterpret the impact of change on their preconceived ideas. Dr. Murray indicated that the current American military culture is particularly susceptible to hubris: The American military culture has returned to Robert MacNamara's notions that we live in a mechanistic world where sufficient computing power will allow not only perfect prediction, but also the ability to control the "battlespace" absolutely. As a result the US may be at risk of misconstruing the future strategic landscape -- specifically the impact of the clash of cultures and the nature of future conflict. Our emphasis on technical vice human intelligence sources makes this a specific US vulnerability. In a poll question concerning the likelyhood of strategic surprise through 2025, the game participants responded that in there opinion strategic surprise was likely. Poll question: On a scale of 1-7, how likely is it that the US will meet with a strategic surprise as to the character of the future strategic landscape through 2025 that will require a fundamental change in the basic construct of our military strategy? ) Exclude the possibility of a technological surprise.) 1--Just as relevant.4--marginally relevant..7--will require significant modification to meet the future security challenges.  Note: as indicated by the smaller "x's", the military participants were more confident in the likelyhood of surprise than the civilian participants.  Transformation of War and the Future Relevance of the Nation State The advance readings and the lecture by Ralph Peters articulated the argument that the future threat would come more from militant, discontented "warrior" actors than from the militaries of nation states. Martin Van Creveld forecasts a decline in the ability of nation states to wage war on other states as well as an inability of a modern technological military to respond effectively to unconventional threats. At the same time, an increasing number of states fail to be able to maintain internal order. Rwanda, Liberia, Colombia, are current examples. However, there was no consensus that the expanded recognition of the non-state "warrior" threat necessarily meant an end to nation-state conflict. For example terrorism has been an assymetric tactic for the disaffected for centuries. The modern state still has considerable power -- moral, judicial, economic, and militarily. The levels of disaffection that takes place in clashes of culture and dislocation that are described by Peters and Van Creveld can only be opposed effectively by the modern state. The participants seemed to have great faith in the continued ability of the US as a nation state and in our continued status as a world power. At the same time, there was no confidence that inter-nation state conflict was any less likely in the future. Several participants were strong advocates of the cyclical nature of history as it relates to the emergency of empires and strategic challenges to the US. Instead, there seemed to be a strong consensus that the "warrior" threat would continue to expand in the future and would require the US to identify strategies and capabilities to respond effectively. There was no consensus that the "warrior" threat would necessarily replace the nation-state threat as the principal threat to US interests. Rather, the "warrior" threat would increasingly impact US interests worldwide. Even if the world's "warriors" do not directly threaten US military forces, their impact on the stability of nation states is a direct US strategic interest. In addition, there was a consistent theme of a recognition that the "warrior" threat would impact a wide number of US strategic concerns to include drug trafficking, terrorism, counter-proliferation, environmental issues, and humanitarian relief. Future US intervention in regions that are dominated by "warriors" as a result of nation state inability -- or unwillingness -- to effectively maintain internal order was seen as particularly likely. At the same time, there was a reluctance of the participants to reject the threat posed by nation-states. This ambiguity is reflected in the poll results: On a scale of 1 to 7, what do you see the prevalent nature of future conflict? 1--An increased focus on war between nation states.4--no significant difference than in the past 50 years.7--Significantly greater conflict by non-state threats (Peter's "warriors").  The participants accepted that the most prevalent future threat would come from non-state warriors but continued to believe the military threat from nation states would continue to be a US military concern. Warnings and Indicators. No specific indicators of change were identified. Instead, participants seemed to indicate that change would become apparent through study of actual conflicts and in US interventions over time. Even if the incidence of conflicts that are characterized by "warriors" rather than conventional nation-state belligerency, the participants were cautious in placing too great an emphasis in tailoring US strategy and military capabilities exclusively to respond to the "warrior" threat. Because of the disproportionate military capabilities that can be fielded by a modern nation state vis--vis even a well-financed "warrior" movement, the impact of a lack of preparedness for nation-state conflict is too significant to ignore. Hedging Actions. The participants described a number of hedging actions that are equally relevant against strategic surprise in the nature of conflict and in dealing with the "warrior" threat: --Expand the emphasis on human intelligence and the understanding of cultures --Increase the emphasis on Professional Military Education (to include specifically historical case studies and regional issues). It was noted that during the interwar years many of the key commanders and future chiefs of service were on the faculties of the service war colleges. Subsequently, few senior flag and general officers in any service have had faculty assignments. --Increase the emphasis on foreign area studies to include greater language proficiency by military officers. (Expanding the Foreign Area Officer program is one possibility; however, the participants noted this was an issue that went beyond developing specialists and instead was important for commanders and military officers in a wide range of operational billets.) --Place greater emphasis in war games, exercises, and decisionmaking training for Military Operations Other Than War in which the threat is that of non-military "warriors." --Expand the number of wargames and exercises that involve Non-Government Agencies (NGOs) as well as non-DoD federal agencies such as the Department of State, USAIDE, etc. in MOOTW scenarios. --Maintain robust ground combat forces -- specifically general purpose infantry units. Dealing with non-uniformed "warriors" is manpower intensive. In addition, the underlying cultural and social dysfunctions that create the "warrior" typically defy rapid implementation of military solutions. Accordingly, the military response to "warriors" requires an initial heavy investment in ground forces and the ability to maintain that force over time. --Deploy the ability to rapidly correct infrastructure problems -- such as electric power, drinking water, communications, basic shelter, medical care, food distribution, et al -- that can increase the military's ability to eliminate some of the more apparent causes of "warrior" unrest. (For the Navy and Marine Corps this may include greater emphasis on combat support and combat service support in forward forces and prepositioned equipment.) 6. US Forward-Based Forces The US uses forward-based military forces as a key component of its strategy of deterrence, engagement, and coalition building. Since World War II, forward-based forces have played a major role in all three components. Forward-based forces make it difficult for any potential enemy to attack the host-nation without attacking US forces. This fact bolsters deterrence. In addition, the forward forces actively interact with host nation military forces and are symbols of US commitment to treaty obligations. This serves to support engagement as well as promote coalition effectiveness. Where specific treaty obligations do not prohibit such actions, the forward-based forces are also positioned to more effectively respond to other regional US interests. Since World War II, most US forward-based forces were located to counter a specific threat -- the Soviet Union in Europe and North Korea on the Korean peninsula. The US forces in Japan are to a degree an exception, deployed as part of a treaty obligation intended to reduce the need for Japan to develop a regionally destabilizing military. US forces in Japan are available to reinforce Korea and have been deployed worldwide to accomplish US strategic objectives. Discussion in this seminar focused on US forward-based forces in the Western Pacific rather than expanding to discuss Europe and NATO. Although many of the issues are the same in both theaters, there are significant differences. The most apparent is the role of multi-national coalitions in Europe as compared to the US bilateral security arrangements in East Asia and along the Pacific Rim. US Security Strategy for East Asia and the Pacific. In focusing discussion on the issue of the impact of an absence of land-based presence, the OSD East Asian Strategy Report for 1998 was used to define goals and objectives. Military forces contribute t the US security strategy for Asia and the Pacific in meeting the following seven goals: --Comprehensive US engagement throughout the region --Alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. --Comprehensive engagement with China --Expansion of cooperation with Russia --Promotion of "security pluralism" (replacing bilateral relationships) --Counter proliferation --Collective response to transnational challenges (ranging from drug trafficking to environmental protection) In meeting these objectives, the strategy listed four specific contributions made by US military forces: --Deter aggression --Enable response --Shape the security environment --Promote "comprehensive security" (terrorism, environmental degradation, infectious disease, drug traffic, energy, humanitarian relief) Time Frame. The time frame for discussion was focused on the second decade of the 21st Century although it was recognized that strategic surprise impacting continued forward basing of US forces could occur anytime in the near future. The rapid implementation of the US withdrawal from bases in the Philippines is a historical precedent. The Base Case. The "Base Case" consisted of a withdrawal of Marines from Okinawa. In discussing this case, the published views of Mr. Michael Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon of The Brookings Institution were used as a basis for discussion. Mochizuki and O'Hanlon stated five reasons why Marines should be removed from Okinawa without damage to US strategic interests in the Pacific: --Marines are not central to the US-Japanese security relationship (as compared to the importance of the US nuclear shield and air defense provided by USAF and carrier aviation). --There is diminishing popular support (in Okinawa and less so in Japan) --The Okinawa-based Marines provide less than 5% of US augmenting forces to Korea. --The US can respond to regional crises equally well from other locations within the region. --The US presence "shields" Japan from a "realistic view of international security." The Base Case discussion clarified the role of the Okinawa Marines in the regional security strategy. The participants agreed with the interpretation that the Marines are not a pivotal military force for the protection of Japan. The Japanese also realize this; however, the Japanese are resistant to any change in the current security arrangements that imply a slackening of US commitment. Several participants with personal experience with Japanese policymakers -- Mr. Farrar from the Foreign Service and Mr. Hicks from OSD -- indicated they would accept a US withdrawal with prior consultation and assurances. However, both took exception with the interpretation that there was diminishing popular support for US presence in Okinawa. Both indicated what is diminishing is support in Okinawa rather than Japan but that even that was due to noise and liberty incidents rather than any diminution of confidence in the Security Treaty. There was no consensus that Okinawa Marines are critical to the defense of Korea or Korean OpPlans. Instead, Okinawa was seen as an ideal forward logistics and staging point for regional deployments for a wide number of contingency operations such as Vietnam, Kho Tang rescue, evacuation of Saigon, evacuation of Phenom Phen, Bangladesh relief operation, Mount Pinatubo relief operation, Corozon Aquino crisis, etc. Discussion of the Base Case led to the discussion of additional cases that differed in either the strategic landscape or the regional security arrangements. In each case the year was assumed to be in the second decade of the century and Korea assumed to have united and US land-based combat forces are withdrawn from the region. The specific cases are listed in the following chart: Base CaseCase ICase IACase IICase IIACase IIICase IVYear 20XXYear 202XYear 202XYear 202XYear 202XYear 202XYear 202XHostile nKoreaKorea UnitesKorea UnitesKorea UnitesKorea UnitesKorea UnitesKorea UnitesMarines withdrawn from OkinawaUS forward-based forces withdrawn from WestPacUS forward-based forces withdrawn from WestPacUS forward-based forces withdrawn from WestPacUS forward-based forces withdrawn from WestPacUS forward-based forces withdrawn from WestPacUS forward-based forces withdrawn from WestPacNo change in regional tensions No change in regional tensionsRegional tensions reducedRegional tensions reducedRegional tensions reducedRegional tensions reducedRegional tensions reducedNo change in alliance structure No change in alliance structureRegional "pluralism" replaces US bilateral security treatiesRegional security alliances emerge w/o US active participationRegional security alliances emerge dominated by ChinaRegional security organization with US as equal memberRegional or world security organization (US member)US primary guarantor of freedom of access/seas US primary guarantor of freedom of access/seasUS primary guarantor of freedom of access/seasUS primary guarantor of freedom of access/seasRegional guarantor of freedom of access/seasRegional guarantor of freedom of access/seasInternational/regional guarantor of freedom of access/seasUS naval presence remains unchangedUS naval presence remains unchangedUS naval presence remains unchanged US naval presence remains unchangedUS naval presence only in support of US interests US naval presence as part of regional naval forceUS forces deployed only under international mandate Note that the Base Case differs from the other cases in that the critical decisions necessary to make the Base Case a reality would not necessarily involve long lead time. Accordingly, strategic surprise is likely. The most likely instigating events are either a serious training accident involving loss of life of host nation nationals -- such as a plain crash in a populated area -- or a series of high-profile disciplinary infractions by Okinawa Marines. Potential hedging actions to minimize the impact of such a withdrawal on US engagement and responsiveness to crisis in the region include: --Establishing alternate regional logistics sites and staging bases for contingency response. --Accelerating improvements in seabasing options (MPS-E, the Mobile Off-Shore Base, or alternative seabasing concepts). --Beginning now to delink the forward-basing of Marines in Okinawa from the use of Okinawa bases as prepositioning sites for contingency response. Case I. The first case specified that there was no change in the regional tensions in the area other than unification of Korea. This created an innate contradiction. US forces in Japan are there due to treaty obligations and security concerns that are greater than simply Korea. The participants could not see a logical scenario that would lead to the withdrawal of US land-based from Japan without either a significant change in the strategic landscape in Asia or a Constitutional crisis in Japan. This case high-lighted the role that US land-based forces play in US-Japan bilateral relationships independent of any specific regional threat. . . Case IA. This case "reduced regional tensions" and introduced regional "pluralism" as a replacement for US bilateral treaties underwriting regional security. Reduced tensions solved the primary objections of participants to the scenario in Case I. However, the focus on "pluralism" -- even though a supposed objective of our regional strategy -- presented problems for several of the participants. Pluralism implies common security issues. There were reservations that with the required "reduced tensions" there would be sufficient common ground to lead to meaningful "pluralism." However, most participants seemed comfortable that this case was not inimical to US strategic interests nor reduced US unilateral freedom of action. Case II. This case tested how far "pluralism" was welcome if it resulted in security arrangements that did not include active US participation. There was skepticism that such as strategic landscape would serve US interests in the long term. More specifically, non-security issues such as trade or human rights would lead to use of the "pluralism" mechanisms to "lock out" the US. On the surface this case appeared to meet US security interests and with an implied reduction in US security costs although the US would continue to guarantee freedom of the seas in the region. However, without US active participation and engagement in regional security organizations it was unlikely to result in preserving long-term US interests. Without US engagement to deter "imperialism" the emergence of another regional hegemonic power was discussed as likely. The participants had doubts whether the US could or should accept regional security alliances that are critical to US interests without active US involvement as indicated in the following poll results. The US is currently the senior partner in all of our security arrangements. Can the US security interests be accomplished with international coalitions or organizations in which the US is either an equal or "limited" partner? On a scale of 1 to 7, to what degree can US ceded security leadership? 1--US does not have to lead.4--there may be "special cases" but usually the US should lead.7--Our strategy and interests require the US to dominate all coalitions.  The poll results indicate a lack of consensus on this issue. Two participants voted "1" indicating no need for the US to lead while three voted "7" indicating that it is imperative that the US lead all coalitions. Case IIA. This modification of the second case highlighted the impact of a regional security alliance without US leadership that is dominated by a single regional power in China. This case presented the participants with a dilemma in that the "regional pluralism" was specifically assuming responsibilities for the primary US security concerns in the region. Is it in the US best interest to cede regional security leadership to regional power no matter how benevolent its intentions? The participants found this case difficult to assess. US interests assume that China in the role of regional security leader would be self-deterred from aggression. Likewise, US interests in this case would be dependent upon the regional security arrangements not leading to a comprehensive sphere of influence emerging inimical to the US. Enmity could be on cultural or economic issues but result in a blow to the emerging symbiotic global economy. The lack of confidence in international organizations adequately protecting US interests without US leadership is reflected in the following poll results: On a scale of 1 to 7, to what degree can an international organization or alliance structure adequately maintain order and protect US interest in a region without the need for the US to play an active role? 1--Strongly disagree.4--Possible but not if vital US interests were not at risk.7--Agree if coalition demonstrated its ability to preserve US interests effectively over time.  The poll indicated a lack of confidence in international organizations with 3 participants voting they strongly disagreed US interests could ever be enforced by an organization without US participation. Only two participants showed any confidence above "4". Case III. This case appeared to be the optimum case for US interests. The mechanism appeared to meet all of the US security objectives. Pluralism served to deter aggression. No hegemonic rival dominated the regional security system. The US was included as an equal partner and US military forces operate as part of a regional collective security system that presumably supports regional "comprehensive security" goals. The participants were comfortable with this arrangement provided US forces were not under Coalition command and that US freedom to act unilaterally was not impaired. The significance of these concerns was made apparent in discussion of Case IV. Case IV. Case IV was violently opposed by virtually all participants. In this case, the US has renounced its right to unilateral employment of military force and has ceded command and control of deployed US military forces to an international military command. A poll question on these issues is instructive: Only in NATO and under certain specific conditions are US forces under the command of a coaltion command structure and not under direct US national control. On a scale from 1-7, how necessary is it that this policy remain in effect in the future? 1--Strongly disagree (US can cede control of forces to international organizations).4--It may be increasingly possible to cede control under certain conditions.7--US should never cede control of the employment of US military forces to any coalition or international organization.  EMBED Word.Picture.8  Thirty percent of the responding participants voted "7" indicating no confidence in international organizations to command and control US military forces. As might be expected, the strongest views were apparent in the military participants.  In discussing this issue, the participants did not seem to be able to distinguish between the employment of US military forces in combat from other security roles. This specifically included "comprehensive security" operations such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, environmental protection, and drug trafficking. One participant indicated that cultural differences are especially critical in non-combat operations. Accordingly, even in non-combat operations it remains vital that US forces be seen as always under the command and control of the US chain of command. Seabased Forces and Other Hedging Alternatives to Land-Based Forward Presence Forces Absent land-based forces in the Western Pacific, US strategy would be increasingly dependent upon seabased forces to maintain freedom of the seas and engagement with regional militaries. The key assumption underpinning seabased forward presence is that the US Navy will continue to be able to effectively protect its forces from attack. Protection would be full spectrum and include protecting the fleet from surprise attack even when operating "inside the grasp" of an enemy's anti-ship defenses. Future force protection will enhanced in the future by a combination of improved signature control by Navy ships and "knowledge" on the part of the Navy of the threat gained through information dominance. The participants accepted the premise that seabased forces were reasonably survivable. This is particularly the case compared to forward bases that are clearly within missile range of potential regional enemies. Accordingly, developing an expanded seabasing capability was accepted as a principal means of hedging against the loss or reduction of overseas bases. Mr. Jim O'Brasky presented a comprehensive proposal for expanding US seabasing capabilities through a change in our shipbuilding program. Through the adoption of smart ship designs and modular construction, he indicated ships with low signature and larger capacity could be built for the same costs as our current program. Specifically, he proposed building two new classes of amphibious ships that would have greatly increased capacity such that they would be able to more than replace the maritime prepositioning ships as well as current amphibious ships. The result would be the ability to conduct seabased operations fulfilling all of the current OMFTS supporting concepts. Specifically, his approach would result in the following: --Each ARG capable of conducting two air and sea NEOs simultaneously (multiple big decks). --Each ARG/MEU(SOC) capable of mounting the entire battalion landing team in combat vehicles (expanded wheel deck space for additional vehicles). --Each ARG maintaining the equipment for a Marine brigade -equivalent so that upon arrival of a fly-in echelon it can be immediately employed in brigade-level seabased operations. --The ability to mass the equivalent of an entire sea-based Marine Expeditionary Force -- to include its aircraft wing -- aboard amphibious ships anywhere in the world within 24 days. (The ship mix has not only sufficient deck spots to support the planned all-VSTOL Marine JSF wing but also the space for maintenance vans to replace the TAV-B as well.) The participants found his proposal intriguing. However, there was concern that if ships were to continue to get larger -- to gain economies of scale in crew and operating costs -- the result of any losses would be magnified. Vulnerability could be reduced if the same signature control features were built into the new amphib/seabasing ships that are contemplated for SC-21 and future combatants. Economies of scale if all ships were built modularly would bring down costs across the board in all Navy ships. The seabasing concept has the added potential for making US forward forces a centerpiece for regional "comprehensive security" efforts. The tremendous capacity of the ships would permit staging of much of the material needed to respond rapidly to regional disasters and to support a wide number of regional crises other than war. Although the participants found seabasing to be a viable hedging action against some of the capabilities and contributions of forward-based forces on our strategy, it was not seen as a total panacea. Specifically, there was concern that the seabased forces would not signal the same degree of commitment that landbased forces provided. This could be ameliorated overtime if the seabased forces demonstrated effective TBMD capability and were seen to be survivable against a major land-based attack. If the fleet is seen as a peacetime presence force but in wargames and exercises must sail at full speed to get beyond missile range before a conflict occurs, it will lose its effectiveness. Accordingly, as shown in the following poll, some strategic changes would be necessary. On a scale of 1-7, can CONUS-based force deployment coupled with seabased forward presence adequately replace the overseas-based forces in the future in underpinning our coalition strategy of engagement? Or will the strategy have to change? 1--No need to adjust the strategy.4--Some change may be required.7--Will require a fundamental change in our strategy.  The participants were almost unanimous in their support of seabasing as a hedging action for a reduction in land-based forces; some were skeptical that seabasing alone would fill all of the contributions to coalition-building and alliance engagement that land-based forces currently provide. Summary The participants clearly thought it was likely that the US would experience some degree of strategic surprise in the next two decades. They identified a diverse number of examples in recent history: (Sputnik, Iranian Revolution, the Great Depression, rise of Hitler, Soviet collapse, unification of Germany, expansion of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries, withdrawal of US bases from the Philippines, etc.) The most likely threat to US interests was likely to be from the non-state violence associated with Peter's "warriors." However, the participants were not ready to eliminate the threat of regional states continuing to wage war and initiate conflicts that would result in US intervention. The need to be prepared for response to the "warrior" threat means that we must continue to be prepared to project military power in missions short of war. The ability to conduct the "three block war" is a major strategic requirement in meeting this kind of challenge. The participants did not believe that elimination of Marine forces on Okinawa would be catastrophic to our current strategy in the Pacific. Nor should a reduction of US forward-based forces come as a strategic surprise. However, elimination of all forward-based forces would constitute strategic surprise because our strategy is ill prepared to respond to the challenge without developing either a countervailing strategy or new force structure. Improving our seabasing capability would be an obvious hedging action to position the naval forces to adapt to a future strategic landscape where there is less forward-based forces and the specific theater of future operations is less clearly identified. To be effective in carrying out any of the four strategy objectives (deter aggression, enable response, shape the security environment, promote comprehensive security) will require the ability to project larger forces than an ARG/MEU(SOC) from our future seabases. There was no argument that our current range of Operational Maneuver From the Sea and supporting concepts were sound. The participants were clearly not in favor of substituting a greater dependence upon collective security arrangements to hedge against the withdrawal of US forward-based forces. This was particularly true if the coalition resulted in any reduction in US leadership or freedom to act unilaterally with US military forces. Strategic surprise is inevitable; being prepared to adapt to a changing strategic landscape remains the key to US strategic preparedness. Appendix A Advance Readings: Ralph Peters, "Winning Against Warriors," Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?, Stackpole Books, 1999, pps. 48-69. Martin Van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," Parameters, Spring 1996, pps. 4-17. Martin Van Creveld, "In Wake of Terrorism, Modern Armies Prove to Be Dinosaurs of Defense," NPQ, Fall1996, pps. 57-58. Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon, "The Marines Should Come Home: Adapting the U.S.-Japan Alliance to a New Security Era," The Brookings Review, pps. 11-13. John Lewis Gaddis, "Living in Candlestick Park," The Atlantic Monthly, April 1999, pps. 65-74. MajGen Wallace C. Gregson and LTC Robin "Sak" Sakoda, USA, "Overseas Presence: Maintaining the Tip of the Spear," The Marine Corps Gazette, April 1999, pps. 52-53. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, East Asian Strategy Report, November 1998 Briefs and Lectures: Dr. Williamson Murray, "Some Thoughts on the Future Strategic Landscape" Mr. Ralph Peters, "Welcome to the Future of War" (Sponsored by the MCA) COL Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), "Assumptions Underpinning the Army After Next" RADM (Sel) Joseph Sestak, "The Future of Naval Forward Presence" Mr. James O'Brasky, "Tsunami 2050" Appendix B Seminar Participants: LTC Ralph Peters, USA (Ret.) Mr. Lawrence Farrar Author CMC POLAD BGen Keith Holcomb, USMC (Ret.) Mr. Andy Hoehn Consultant OSD Strategy RADM (Sel) Joseph Sestak Mr. Frank Hoffman OPNAV N51 Boren/Rudman Commission COL Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.) Dr. Williamson Murray Author, Commentator Army War College Col John Priddy, USMC Mr. John Hill OSD Strategy OSD, ISA, Asian & Pacific Affairs Directorate LtCol Len Blasiol Mr. Frank Mahnke MCCDC Concepts Div JWAC, Dahlgren CDR Mark Basich Mr. Jim O'Brasky PP&O SIG NWSC Dahlgren LtCol John Wissler Dr. Brian Finlay-Dick The Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution Maj Ollen Richey Mr. Jeffrey Lewis PP&O SIG CSIS Maj Vic Splan, USMC Mr. Ethan Glick Wargaming Div, MCWL CSIS Mr. Dave Dillege Mr. Harry Frank MCIA MCIA Mr. Ben Davis Mr. Frank Jordan MCIA Wargaming Div, MCWL Col J. A. Lasswell, USMC (Ret.) GAMA Corporation  Noted by Dr. Williamson Murray in both his lecture and in his article, "The Emerging Strategic Environment: An Historian's Thoughts," Strategic Review, Winter 1999, pg. 44. PAGE  PAGE 1 BRSTXYabq}~'78sX Z \ g j D U q 5ABO #޹ޫj0J6CJU6CJCJ5CJ 56CJ 56CJ 56CJ 5CJOJQJ jUmH5CJ6CJ$ 56CJ$j-EH6UmH jCJ$UCJ$jCJ$UmH5CJ$ 5B*CJ$ 5B* CJ$ 5B* CJ06SUVWXcdef'86dfd d  V  $SUVWXcdef'89UsW X   Y Z xy45qr!  z{_`  389UsW X   Y Z xy45qr & F h$r  w<=lm?<"#o& & F  w<=lm?<"#o&! " # $ % i j "|tqnkT              EFG+&'(RSX    )! " # $ % i j "$4&&{(***,+hh & F$$lR%$$$! # i C'J'**++,,,,//88?H?]CgCCCDD OHOOOOO&Q'QQQGSHSTTUUYY \'\__%c&cddeeee$j%jkkllllQoXopprj B*UhnH j B*UhnH CJH*j B*UhnH >*CJ5CJ5CJ B*hnH j B*UhnH 5CJI"$4&&{(***,+-+++,,,,//r0s000=2>233_4`4 5!5668888;=?n@o@@@A¿}zwtqrs]UVqr12fgTUfgZ[\]  ,  .      :;<|z+,+-+++,,,,//r0s000=2>233_4`4 5!56688$$lR%$$$888;=?n@o@@@AA'A(AOAPAAAAA B!BBBBBBBBAA'A(AOAPAAAAA B!BBBBBBBB\C]CDD1F2FFFF0G1GGGGG8H9HHKM O OOO%O-O}xs          .uݼ޼34/0fgCDefxyde}~,B\C]CDD1F2FFFF0G1GGGGG8H9HHKM O OOO%O-O6O?O$$-O6O?OGOHORO\OfOpOzOOOOOOOOOOOO P;PjPPPP&Q'QGQfQQQQQ{wrmhc^Y  b  |      ϳ      N  }    ۴    )*  7  D  Q  ^  k  x              ĵ  εϵ  ׵    "?OGOHORO\OfOpOzOOOOOOOOOOOO P;Px$$l>2 &zt"n($'$$l>2 &zt"n( $$;PjPPPP&Q'QGQfQQQQQQQ R*RgRRRSGSHSxSSS|L$$l>2 &zt"n($QQQ R*RgRRRSGSHSxSSST2T_TTTTTU"U,U_UUUUWX X~XXXXXY|yvspmjgda?PQ            3  W  {|        @  o    αϱ    :  p        -.  H$ST2T_TTTTTU"U,U_UUUUWX X~XXXXXYYݬ$$l>2 &zt"n($YY\ \__Xb"c#c$c&c d dRdSdddeeei$j%jjjkklllPoQoppqqrrs|wrmhc  Z  v      ŕƕfgh  k  m  !  "  ?@A      à  Ġ      &Y\ \__Xb"c#c$c&c d dRdSdddeeei$j%jjjk$$lR%$$$kklllPoQoppqqrrsssuuCvDvv & F+$$lR%$$lBR%$$$rrrrrrssuCv-./T\]^vEOZd,@ٖkw 78>?@BCIJKLMVWÿػػػػػԿش0JmH0J j0JU>* j0JU>*CJ5CJCJj( B*UhnH 5CJ5CJCJj B*UhnH j: UVmH B*hnH jB*UhnH 9sssuuCvDvvytzX}Y}}}} ~G~H~~~~~Z_`b-/STU]^4v֑¿y{+  {{  |  |  d}  e}  V~W~fa&{Άφ abj~Ҏӎ (+ )efg/vytzX}Y}}}} ~G~H~~~~~Z_`b-/S$$$STU]^4v֑!CEPQcd56$ & F+$$lR%!CEPQcd56NOST ijFGjklmnopqrstuvwΘ67eƙ^_֚ WXכ؛ 2QRr256BMNb6NOST ijFGjklmmnopqrstuvwΘ67eƙ^_$_֚ WXכ؛ 2QRr2345677@ABMNOPQRSTUVW&`#$NVW/ =!"#$%/ =!"#$%n;r$#RG PNG  IHDRkSwsBITOPLTEܹԫ̙ɩѽ߿ԵҩӧNw̙3y23h,~qz){|{~reo,f3iP|i+Z-_`^ff3mI$ZK:MMLcJJJ%VDFB=D8,L3333955* 4& %%$$$  "bKGDHcIDATx wGQ)=ֱCmAT [ݽum:gBwvv~vEʠR|\P\ hP TU*V@[L?Qcp+T Fڒ8B` B tː@5ZfUjT`T!?`?/U%ŻPd bJ|%uy_c,.s ?2&Xla`47ƶ]@^WhۛeGSZTkH 7G͵ؙ4XtEڶ܀PGmOhRܭOl l%E=HU_AXa uR&Ty;=lkVUd e;߾Fot֘*ySgMs3>0=?-^SVn.= q1?*R]7xXnq-"ZwQWQĎ{pMDyD߅rEwg fVqevlѱ=o>_hu ֒Bj,M=?9h&=<G^k7uL}lCXЖ#y@9Tbϕwn^Iϛjq`XcMSиQ"W4R:p#X x6b W7"zGwkc1]_Ce$8#֒XxT7*Vؒ4-v0"WWh]bݖ}rcϙ:M0VѾOz5I0Mx^2usvX+ Sɥ'Xwن:)!V]'*!@rмtZKo$r.VvaeL`**{ЮyIdǏu56SkxkTP{EU^V%)sA_Z p 0ipASK6mizt$̞8f󖰜m|4ڷWYcfhc`'E^_BZcƍE}TSZbpl3Nm`mρF{c+5M\JuSuTmj%wY>^IÚIGĕ E"*:w@rL:y|S>֨XYk8b2LFtxf.ih.ʀUjukz4-CwY槖ȵX#b=n GaCfz U[zKPND6<ն5&p, ^ei.}(3Z5'ٿId%Zodzh[s̥KҲ;,cfZv*aGl2X=R[M @}ҹ~6kZj7VJcc%W͑e8kFzhS7 #v5 ,H9is( {0 mVi L$y{wWÊMoo-X-7Ǭ)9eکibd= Fe{L'b&tNU׸WtX阇c:LHo*q%ăjMC,H^DĽ]v O&x1r 9ڷG"O[߿~FXk*VFl}ʽŃp4z7 8rE.v7_B`mc+vzIc-`0U44=Km\4㼰Gl3l'5,7{Ĥ7QF0\qA/|x{_CDm.[QB5:k>Zdo M܍96xkʴm|ED^y 0 T)!K-h4:<^O^<۟(FF~J6(w C*a/k>\i=6t"EPpfXk>7Დ$#iSCd1{4pq橁j+ƬI ю;T8QNa["jQQ/x+N{0+c XXVt ւb]kէX1Շ!va^O[Tj:4R}gO2լ(`e#8M$քFˉ5⪈W45C/9UsÆ]pcmSC=c|! pcc`ő7G'ae5<c5 kq9k)LF4(bhub  0ç򌽜q5LXoL9.D>&e .E@Xg fScp0s8J$HųZּ%>31e5D7OMyaso5'SF/rsgK-&wu-\+M@؜̒JDP>nG Va߻>;/XJh * X =6ъF[MŎ\ulXJD{VCôBf6Ė( q`$\J7*xFO!VN ߿oSX+ݣӎ|mĞ9sXڄF-'bU|.LѨ_c7} ;l6.Cyp;ݮX4zC;Sᐻ ,&1V@E ֈr|#Scb鯱>o?@N*yN ~y"+lcEG VjuีOh|7~æƱp= }G8Qfv}m̹(X-kn+7ˣ_cF['b U2XkU_R1yXM[O`L+U:,!'ky`o4xXQI+u+;V="2޷:,= q[iAĐUk|I"nG|hʟst8V(ȳ8|4!nc德v>A Ј*= ܉㤈c]$}+w φc-sX1,M~O=e (~-tPqVt} sTΛCV曌TeE r KWuX$MǭÌ_ɽ0V VQIF;ɲ\x)*͗J2k^;X}h<W Kɂ3 A5.HxИak#sE4c:k$ŝwɓLX/w 1ڥ11掾{Wg*̵1NVX,/8l1^ykIa^iFW~tojCUɧ(`EꊗeUG"ƒx˽{X3ژ+XҊN7o AwVt V6 V!z8`%˄!e{pUb+|?'%򰋯lpXN& 1^l Z>.{VN/h!S@CzaIz6{ ]p[P'0&ms^±EZ,X [6}O$[CXv||yHPX|O|tޗAaPyU?Ξ9lvK|YJY _?/+ "i$ٺe[W ߆zyFG?'H:.aqfd>2@9]T|8`m[gj P`b]YceVeAsܺR W\X3$rkR*If9Xr (W^*O|ѯ,Wf" 4 S#cv6kj *xd'3<'Hk&`U~,E{i܃ܜl}Ҿh[uޯ [] Arkz,4t̔kj±ZI?s*4 5P9 U_QNxPLX_P8^>WAp*UPA.Xuk ŚzbA0WPkU{9)7D)s+)rS RЯbM.R*r]9= /X 5~lk|.X֠0X_ɺ Da`}[aU8Va#?FvwAHӿ~~uxz*C/(T"PXgyfOMo?D; # 0_^3I25MBؔ ֔U4 ן`/XS ̫?7'SޒOKs~^1 @vXa;b Z-&?ZFT#f`'H"z7W8ʃ#ds߲VV苿4Q|P_azSVh'3~U/UIpP/Ze,.P%'~r=?8˘B GzaZdZ2zҟx7t6IENDB`ingmilitary.htmlT GCFileAlias0000 PowerRAIDBDgamingmilitary.html2TGoPjGoMkTrash#PowerRAID:Trash:gamingmilitary.htmlOpenRecentItem-Dd@  c fABDesktop Folder:Future Marine.BMPbOYL9~nά+De$n#.[}/|tYL9~nάPNG  IHDR@ PgAMA pHYs$$ IDATx$˲$IzyΩ:U]33CcDd2B2=i#jA@u23"i1>{430Y-_3ϿmKܟxe=COwEN8˿~;d-ooӋ_82,OԾRzBzޑ-g]_O=ь}&)yR0E? eurS?N|)meޒ~{;AOϳmd}nR~,?_Z;mӯ =j6rp7pd,EyzZGG>%=ç%n) sC˅t|/3Mvp~嚸̻"1 YNSMxdMe_}fWx XuT9*TnP}j, -Ca )ZVĿ8[hScy(7*߲ۨjt[I?Pķ_d\zOۭ6a\??́Eޖ}.0q4[ZCj3*$_>v-[?Gi@dL 7>߼h/{~<77j52ӫY!!i٠f/?>`W'8Rdf DXV*aK\? S:m\S@_?{Q^JO fO—C~/-ui7t]Fi#<CjH0}L5^\EYՋlL?D`3<ұK|I#:ƹy_u |J +Ө cj7>澹qxDᡖedؚCX 99 Gڗ1Xi`u> @ڒSA_e,?HYy6r`0N;oh7l0%F15h=nHeh\ ysz6!kKzz"Jޑ<{C@_n8 2/9ȱHڝJF> . Cد0rh*[t&:Ʀa IHc_^loq }QB|7G~*^1z8+:٠#BF !JȚwf-m(b%vJF8@Y hD+JxKrrݾ.}rMw@AM ~0+߀Mw|=.藍E#6>C_S/]@P_ھD&Ӟ:+P5E9)ՙ>8ЖVMqs[SZfCsW}e6Qpr豆F0=yUDX+L"@s\{:bl(Bb'Q\ͽ=AQ-xkpj1e.l?dYiuz@9eF~5!%SW`c|D[DC}է/s|eg3ݼlju 8^~/t 6}/ݴN7N?}I1)M >7~?x$C>R>w3}3t3@Nm{Ó~j\Q0y8#?j_χZ(_I6a:ZQ4!|Zyr`&O]%!ut$_lP :x n.?'Ah]#0,DG:|_8UhC&5?!X }-9'J\w;$HvY$uXJfr7=M;x,^Ť%V&Ё>դ5AwF!2˵##$1 $B\+SG0GA[)0R!]oBS"CPLgU#% YjR;[F~φS2m#p:<_tݍZtyw ~1Tp*82B?=Btǽ lt-'!6a>4LH >xpXp:Ս!xk|f_̣!>kՐ7-{[u%5F-F ǝd ؈LAݐ\ϭP;yӇmWܞ}؀J% aPB }@/iϾl-pbO;wĎ|f 'A'$U5n:ߤ~w)p ^jm_ J !UdgҶi`( V٥;LvgC׫O8r F&힠3q{9/]=Ckp||KC212^ ;ӑLlU*9 tqQ`rl7<5Bt 3[aR֏EW$Ji~Aؤ9CEٴ竢[HB$3,5 z?OLIL1Na0q`JX"4-A/S׋uy0 zNj#@Rهvyuu\ˬu7g~-$PHP޷b\+G{ANOȨK*&=ki*/d&(/JQ#FKC2a:FZ C,&[9k%gpj ]Ė|U56}jiI=L]WS'dJ~rEu "$| ΋єY' s qyv8k'p7IA} );)!c'ӱ1x#0=2eڍwtB!ЊA^dk/-gzɜÀ1=+UDĄ$[;e7ŞfNFSrڀ$)fcpC%e Nr{8񫒸ftzR *>5%E} Q-@@Ae vIoGbԅ`ml(TA))םF/L\F2fl‹&cy|J fԶVq77ng]=^x%q s^-=HO ul\#yXAz/@U<#C$0{]Mқe˩LRǮ"jÒ-ZVKVLj_jzPu] {u=(౺ąX^@"וXe_zrdJaR* u?:bhFㆧ-YlhS)5VqbʑsaFm{|ˇU 7>/P<ښ*~TA}Cԣ([,t"Mq==f1É1B86霜*`õ+nXF1j|̴G*΀l(|m e OլӨ<4%E{ P]^pE})fݞ5xofl?ëC-3,+%$i0h01GSƤjP:gn;AiVK+h0 BFY2l=o;D tJsA X }7nRx$Rڔ"fȚ82i1irMbC4u/-!!]髇J"&ee2m"'$39l4*n@q #e[!uՎJ'DK =>ho#ڞx˲ֱỦiMǤ/)aadkȧ_W\q`p>Z͏7X-hGwV|mc qYi 0эOSlv'#?P0b[ԣrs2Y7rwO> KIT!Gs)Zr^}Sa7v ĩ'2`PyqHuQ P1 VFפy#.r@9U_MX2<Я:s@13}`R x* 2P"P'Sv3|"6oG?Oݙ8/B&DW[B!0??f\W88Kdq/PhTxUiSb~ Ĩd]L~(YX3<Eaq ˋ_`{sd.?+I~ i@`4(!u-r ?i"椣9!ٓ90P`' A('1h B%=}5lx[%/kJLrs!<2H"hTr%j!^!/X4pr.=p y&)Z84$ߖs[>>n J#5v88Қ!n+Gz0pRL {H-rV~`q@ '~}>g;S&֧jyAO||_+ m"w{]"tHTh)1;qGWHœ%9XnK1Oh)œcBQ1%(r 97՗V5"eq`:'ͅwӾRBL-,D%c=8RYR0r&7@YlM)H" P, Sr9 D1J: 8o#1-صCY1n =ap5w|w,)N^"n%@P_at R&@T {„12‹rZ 0O<%T( X ʠXK( i?@臥,m5"*U_.\t)Tg]}X0S`d%7gNv̩nnw5BJā/h/ ÄH8Oy̅p=ë*YhOIP¥I.e\^e:2R(EaP'ݑ-&+8WV`BrMBfNak ΕzHkX޼5J%xy1}Y; 9j%7) 2BG&oA D +5=uJg `B\'/`$"z꟦"&,dx܂&ԮRSӼ ΧBtX5fݣ9HWՇD9Zf^Rvτ0X(7K :{:2.uϴjaPȔNKQ&Iؽ~c*Tf #0MJتq]dI/:#TrXxМ@PQ{@=@%-r)q.FU`0AE1SRZZG`KԚyݞWPEP8#G}Q~LCE8TSa_"&ƒFGIvQ%3C1BYH@] g.^8-\ {zG[ /V@8a&g=aۑNtPKqAB})l# >`$ʄ'^0|w<8pM0أB"T,e9O FO $S%%WR•Pa>jxJ^0g[1*X$zZ#wW*pr#vKȐʣېCKVy9 3%|ʹD lY? W 6a=3 T p&"8.l ӀC#< 翈 j`l^嫏(nXq'w~mm@Gʲ7WgStE*` _0 Q,( [&QD[1^~$ȹwӄqZ{"y db̗~(R5"0 XLp.ɝ+l 6`# +REm^%-Aeq`N k4 T|ǡ )dQb .TmN^A@ӝmXF0To9G"1*6dp[6arF+_m%Z0^58ȒuD섀S3[Rŭj3b;рǜ8#`:] ~w:U<Ճ7K et{s8?k'?rK21-!y]tQZumX=]sfwSgȀ |l v%#Tf&A6h\v o)9|WxB]m5o0@iDڲ̸f$4-V&;mXC_2x)@^\x> }PN7mW9"ڔ- O߫w,O fɀC^D֛s J ?b69=Hb LI{2ᓛ(VlȞr3. "mT H Kx ^puJ h mj"1 up0gH-;%@O:ybmf.aAY4 Tp=Sc٢@NSj=CNϤ93G!sRx`2XdheECd~3Ѭ!!qT(J (r*Xfz,) ) _k kU,p:┘7Rg X>&-y P :àg?N} Tt*Ȍ/ Y}I!d!5>TPp׼joʑ;?O_%PwxQ.|L#H ,h:{DaqF12ݔ\MhNc^NG1$u/mģ:Pm^vN8TfBk4Cf~7wX+q4!/̰74JnrM*0 "]!0 @2vp1-V8QK=F!֑-h.SF-H4 <cNY_O?^+uyM_ʿY>?|׶7w/_5?o?۴/}7H6䙇4HH\9Wk*`2C99NNeN#R?@Pߛ'gF/MPnN&ž 2/3L>ξpLD(8OG>#ʄ\7CekM{qAD <Sf \N0 & ,}: GKq pDQtq"Ei  s%rⷭ<"7XD&R)<}V)SPT]M~fُf avJة LXo/_rIlj:4F _IFt(+f{0 60 u'< %Q܁…p@ T* RF$GR4mYߔJ| IVEЂ˞o(/#(E25੠NdAK-8@|4y@PInqВs9caDX =:5n":B9;)SSP8R;e"€+Ab0 ?ZU5Qke*DMions~<7{(SjNG7(f|>8N⻍QZGGNdhS)&q7[ڈ7-Iyv G̟?}`?̖MT,R;4V E@]3 *fׅ]m= aԇ ͭrԔ O_4_Mߤ'* %abyB@x@+:y3*$)yp[S'.85 i__q',]o|ɗĻvo}c=ſ;^ouލ.~˷oӷOֿ?Կ>75n^KZ*VTDiϾywZp?أm{'qIHTjJZQZR?B_)J[JÐ 0Nbo3}]ks zw|y8sdLJOT5ΘIo YG݉t@}3&(GaeޒON$Yo9?1vq>Y}iw1Fpc<'̿i5!BADIHz[J!9W鲖bٝc ;զE5GQ(Y 3vN LaN.{?"U!.KFgCM#| T{5u.-΀V@z 'j321_1IOŒ3м1b²MI+q)bw'F *2kV2^…u&5bH*a֧WIzrWzRSH R#h̾[raD"\APWL'<'4qc.=M y L:gtMdWbd-?kRm0v 'SQ1:|S&_5]  ji\OY%TgExQf>Vy[qEwE6N{ن\eWc͇9Y]8FWU#Ǚt5^JGVQeoSuwh> sNWmdvIzK8lbgw8oz`L/+l=FkC=2v5R)Ͷ拎K]|q:?NN$S3\ ?`O!lO~Ǿ͎]O/#?w_?իo>?MƧ'G߷|駿o-Cq>2͇*4.V/{TYɫPFϷ/+ rڶ9<șg{J̝4MYCGgܻNw؊G=κdS#-y5,ǝǏF.ϥ49soU$e]7hG \-mv;H։^zЃ6N76wOnγ\&Gܱ5 qs,'97Qs/S:_'r٥gCDVؽu6Љ^0LLS2Ӭ[8(OwyB@뒑.nyJ`#y)y;٣@"|h Yjp7[n-!Ň;`PkC,V/6q@uDXN$2ѥ1:9&2u4Sf1(` h~P ʢ܎FX@Q֎R6y;*O0KHƒ̝$#,J b'sHiڏ0!ݵ4ȥ6Fఱ)٧U\ybէWUJWVqotDͤu;^0Ӥ/E+vzjPhDrL⸐Q զ1}ROs}[2]pwb4G=EutdJގdk[҅4W你{ )~7ԱyDmK bT rW' d]͇yۋW/Q-my擷ӄx?-1SHBDtGpYr?u)q V b0|rߎD'1 R-D2eBu\ Sso|7?_7 ׏_o>6{O3nT2nx ot "@0P'w#;)ܝqۯ_G?|\\_>i~5zqυ[w_xt;J܏<>\($`J4)^,U hzYJS.Ϫo~a0n.oҏ#S Ac>%ϯ-)ǙNDЕfNsiœ$"͹a UV<\̟ kLMӐTbO@i*-@RAq&WWv>M%Zنڼ66ᶛŧCˏ5P:a}Ӆ+SPP gT2m,r>Z<9v4 G-ÔrT \nmY\5Jv8`-7,#fgRu5[H δ)g"J $guw߆(,JOn:{s) }T`\u c0^\S(-)ss 7jN.)'f_\ IRٳ5 #ISC<(h=&zCW5A|oiVp$R# )o8B2Σ{Pՙ\OYRuF^vggaL=/C,<ٙKƭy]Lyh/|&w6J QKͫga7 9_k[*>=(i2DBZ*Ia ɘ R[YbӲQ'V,9x.Is YR)u692cI6m2^JI:ᎀieg/1y3?3?_x_?O}X^A0 Z pt5 HI P@0\ko}ˏ?GO_zˇ?/~~kL}p?fQ:! Kl Q9[ dǤKGP4O$',c4Y\R%33]ͪ*99-BQZ>g7j{Orz88L\p)TT)%_׷L)S $8SЂZDq oQIOTcRw8'|:mhra&9W06N[AZ0,+ J !^"ճQ^9:.5i[GA'wGP{(Qs"'Rv'<Ye9û=]y)SHZ_C^jDͲT%=(X-b}?X &DEdN`?U/ 0wԜGAiH4ah qGɔ"Gvb. }X)Wd"ӃLq"-"ir, jXPރ 0)$0gePM&}9<_u).4<$yVPhgȋɐ{3"/mW"z)7?=5YGFD}$ъAяZJ h}'xTiVhx\`5SEh\s<Au#w#zUjR/3=2!E3!H53yT6ץO׻=iCJ^xߓFR LcDNd=W& UNTNRt\ M8y~wO7_?.J?U %)a]jCD~7?*px{n7S~'O~O]<=_8w%3Ӹg|"@mXP` 5քyz[XkS\zR|^)> YqzFCsx/B>")+7 ʤ="5΄bN9#=([}\V;9yKArVB(eUJ&Ī9}dY(%Z3r N*`0~.XkJL5UTQ5=Bӈn; GSRB.,ʩb-li |A=j}W$Ø s̅PlI )'0=co5 R^{ n6(tN[k~dP:cl/-BnExeI  (+٨Ŵ-rd*It*MjHe2VQn坘g4=.9S)1>I3̠'Ex%mI Lhg'^eZP2T - j!C+ a޵fu2VK'l%Ep 3>߼]1KVJ~` 2J.Qwrvs\c.sr|%JG^T&[!0CT(2D`r_NY#FtQ.kEY{ZlCՙ )DmwRr\~Mi+uYK{.d!Aj RL]i1C*bsx6Q^PNى͓?,EJM riܛ㶩X\ū{_4g:B崛Ta%;M7O%Wځ2s%cZr.y:-QZ:gNNNkT;VS[=dpa{Y=ɋg^^}K'~/?wtsy?}cX2!Nd0f 푙=)M͐3 {w[WO>z~# u*$RQyfyƀ6y>*GBuIp-R~w:MZϾwo۝1\: kRkwS(\}MiX =E*='rbB,|}2;o2d LN@)*loiRY#I3(+)mpBBzFMF9@dOךItVcÛA+b':gliۖvrBo:IՅtu,eRx0F%.tGOp($H!]2+c#wf5#fUm6%q- {OϠ .4ͩqo"eAC ˥zΚ\j:..D&C xFOC4'&щ9Q@a8A^7kRM @1+ X!y bA*M:{Sx Y)ƅe"iן'NÓ$FB^1 XB}>MbH Fkf6sSCM݋p<փȷq_{ow|>jYX'/0 a%X@ +Hįμ׼̻ʓ?_/?'o}9Q39a…}ӒR؇{.I+HeDeZu;?@RЋh[t7opWc:Qh{OFƕբ+Wh+Ey̓^s{*9KSkq=Efi[y#@Rr^{ װpj#idMX,Zh˰0!>o ]oQk}T.Vط5`Z1)JИ#r1GΜ@~H,S9kZQJc[e*R3?P>lz+tʨ;d곥rN$].v>^g>\8O$)Q9$Yur;ڇg:517 La|^>u{ooֻm_9y~a__ؒ ~/]wqV}7S ZF=ɏ4X2ZP̟t9L<.\=c#yҤWNw XnNvç,(ݻtr:qr1H)y[1kݽ+Æ|"J''\MQFAT$LSSjH)D^O2%qc-L<909rt |~ct>??LH#(+G vϤr'Mڼ\/O+w-_ͅ2 Y`3%cQtIҘYK%1'u*j$\y!($y\\ a Mt\i R5{f"2A˪0!V}^k/-"5rHÌ#^ICh&V({ Ϩ@$ë(kƱe,:ͪ{%e&FȐZ9JO 'GSP'+T14!{rY>d}PO)\E-<-#jx/ nѫ&e."\"vk__'^c=Q [\WZ䐕Ȟg?sˠC8_S•7HGd>{x\.HN [3;JT$5GjL46 yoe .>x3UHb"5ի Zz "lT|zw,2lI7(ٓ/hc^΄醷D5BZ'=a{"Bڮsy-q9ij95>Z }x{̖T.Tdb"E>QCC'r%BW{?uboşx/_/}gK=̧7ʃ9Ϳ{O _h踽p^_U}g;Sow>};%-ჇF>Mq^S?O'wfh$2A_@rΟ~?7ѳ-?ܦnra„ͫ܃2b\A'%S lm~,c[  c.1<2x1*C-M3)2YHYKVGtZ(R !; )bf.s^$Py3-= L`%]=&*B8>;=T<5z0-cۇ9N}kF衫g ٩*kdM6"< ]JۑIEl[\*evKLC2\wR*Ľ}DxQTj 5@Y$K k𑦥R-eŕW2^D3 9SiER-Ynj]bEnCc.7lB$  )s TmrG9FZON8"9Ktl&$Q.!K$"1"T B#5j˵;4o"'fwlRKE;$3QJQ%+QI\p! z$[s10KaY;l*7+oR8ysڧzxZZ-6Bi.c,/8#Ph~qΌMH wRߝeHلmhn1|"9VĤ!ƭxZݨOÅ#+>Txo|A/J=0.Nv7F/N:}h<>>~FzO/W~W?ݯexȗ<_NM~[/}=ox~ڰo܆,*>h(@a>;λo_ɯ?;}XT"`u?eeN9$ crA ?Rr^ b(uYPٓDCuP l:#>F"hA`0]Sy}ȉ051I8 Ɋ 7-UbR Yjbn{Q< _i}Jcxbr}R\c6Ǡf#bN<9(I}'n9uƈTBC-:] #Σi31adFyta1I΅nC'Ds,O!:9.38,B)K\ М<Ϟ˜in#\=~: [i/4^'۽„`:d:2u2Zk%N7G}jJ7փL;iFsfw*ҹ4p_1_< ϖiA)I)FHpCND!@"NB)e1𖴗 "iS4+ $vE݁ck;y/e2: ƢJcO`hx&-}j}ίww6j(˔(ɲ՘dʼn9c < G2L< YF2N(`D(YEQE| d$ >Zr3Ph#ȑNPz@yZitu dps25k ~0K` +gI`bN5C"v]6AFC!ȐgDc0b?!L"t\dKԛ ?Q\@ϐtE# 2D8pi:7-A I|Zx-;#P˗ʑd՜v5oEu4CRt;F䍫&>{"zM0rQƖSBB8Oˢ*B 3 DxfDLU COeE(iP# 0uN=s?y>} ?\3ƸM7ՙwjÕ}ԯpo<}-5OpK[>xt5s_/ƿ>NwOם֣{i +4:zddX;S L+*vm#1 JbPpa@g*J/rhs4Iu5 !gN\l&xC\X% {w53 0 (N.ٹ(E`; zu $G9`{_nr$^otlrems}T&Ns6y&1 R!}z) ܘ#ĺ@;;匔:M k_* nW6`49#F&K .Dbɦ6G mNlxN1% Q)`֠t0aKhB9)ڏp8VŊ4SaN\ՙ@eFɠZ 8$MLB! Q(!2@0"1.јITA^1 (W>WBL)\@kPU Ț jS+/H4S Yh,OyΈhWYRʴS&Mui^ Y ?D ,̒WP]{ħ<:N̤pXX 4y8P/Ězc-s`r2ݹLHj7A!X@81e$XQL9$xk[*beHª'rHT<\2B? )KAF~W.?aIvCoSJiӀuƺKq$Fuwִ*Y!4U{JC)Ѝ6N$8 .k Ⱦ޶4!Um6[\`y9d;TE=pgʨb E-k"́kVAV̸׍MֶO-9r1^ %,8JJW GB;'ϯo]oݼz>1pU{߾G6<ߗgկ%uȏ7~w_'oԏ4FEL .M̈z-a~߼9{@ݲ}&=oֺٴͫ7.9OIT!@˾,u)hxvϓ vFLHW{ 2"iVE 1}A;[Q`GwUq,7ZF uἸ_a~sLFe:E" Sxi!-H&ERN r\~:ӣ[ZER"\iJeCi@@tky=G2JȐ$(Eh!Pd7˕&KnWnG\a;u™!c k-[) X PBk묥C&a'3wzd]*9;Ckn̋vLN}Xyi9(ݲ p]Ekjfw`7d*ż wGw#:i &bBX7$LpL)2z `9Zm&mG[,%C8e8To#u8U+JCQ9c8{ r =ɐi" 7Ӯ2o.H&VE^9e:62@9PSF5[o N.32@him+)5z@)yd̶&=R{եPR@BusÉ8;4!5u0TXO{6E*љ jx<TAd@[9SIFIn{ 3Z2(g*+Pf_ʖ{ ,(•qe]}zkMOB&֒[Ds$Cͦu]Ș8/'Z{14ޢ s˙xr"Uc֖n,%S. /BKp)ģdB)#&} v5N1սz[@;;ir5!oB0$Z-HlHȤ (z#s"} .ATD -ȂjڈWBQr{8%"VIdVɐSՉ@WnbgE`1%a0@ɑU\ũdU]ŁU6\Z9:h Ct3PQ@WOE-BX!up `"$3G@z"]pnK:[:l#CH5 PN{(0Zl^/1qTLgd~ZJTS'D@GdFxr3`ƒSH*M8 P |g]G!@3 o9r $NDǞėvP@TXS32@Ij)r v#! ^AtShCiYT3:x Xjprj"@3음sf5^2sY~9ؙV%{ֆJ V;1, v?˿/?~g~e˻/<ǩϿ>LK|я|wXq]뷎X;_{_o?w07o^+dK9徦N~Q:Qto'=8]VnkW=P{Jh}7|W_٘͟  H>_'w|OJxޤ-v\1rwl#-DuDد9`. Q oEW,qĩ@H^WDzX̺%1v sObtGL[_(ӊR3l.gsI#dV}0t#m IDATI!W^V)g= .摐i->QApANMcgwւ!nj_ ?3)q[FDCtjqf΂ BJ\5" ]@$S¾ “ lȠl1ܙ b*`%K[N)18v n`X;h\BxE0d 8]!5lw{Z32AF5#3ٯ"Eʧ00 J!9𩰓8 ]% ys82`2Ec X31< !@{`GX:{5 SgAgޔE@҄<Cpl< )u!3*&,:; YFVO:+1<EqbN[G$+ S/>TFʙ0qx6`xsD4G'r1]:H!@9y ʼnAow(I@c#gZNZ|!܎mshLER؅gX%pFژ{h=R$OtGÄZW XfŠU:o#Av*J1Œ)"#Y `u!:Wȫ)0#Ôم}@!&D#uة5qg *tgq?//z{͇~H> yw>''ovWww}3ۺoۏӝo TA7gr4f38< XcL-;ڟIQ?_=yP:tg |l r .+v&OK_ ";o`l&$Rn5B m`N6 pt,9 8F7; i+02gfnW.GPtCH|1 UXz0L psC,1;@_@r7̨M;*b(&k~(tf4%î $Dto̲QfTY4A$ .=X0bmSӉ#{TvЌN@.)SపAibcrkk~yh$3a^ S Lm34 c0ƒ Jd\3HX9f!-l&&MŎᘍ? S4yr(Pv$9q@Qa5`Gpt H="ܻyd}5na&Vh'p)C $r2w6 *ofNnr8ʐr_,D GOC933OҒM P 2,e"k0@-Bg87 k <r: `r9^;o/ K Pc3Ö"|AVC [U{sN4&Z}X8 :pF {Mh=b _z2)ǾdHSۼ~KWGB#Csttj* ̀PGi0ֲ4FR,I]7N _5"v3! G۹$)a|^+DUxC񪐻X;jUk */>2//^i:y5{\|~xi{4#L#Es8+?k?|x?#m-Y1 Dq 6b5҉e:2휂daVc6f${ t\W*( N(Йpq4k'n˾E*[s"V%4\5rf'ru!k@<2CúpzH0`8{qEpA6fc&Vz i1qI?g qxXv8#rnj 0A.(2D bu{G %EȭNJGL୻b)sR"_-3"˲.S!pyɧ},DlN*AБ"2-|n g )Zj4GNP.:~T8@ ?!0A#C*D-RxļIxRjzCy!"0C bC*Q 1cjACgXtH %fiQL !YJ}Jn7bnH@p) bdX8m:&H$0 鴶ςY73C: vw-+ƥAW!ΐQR҂G_wG1L/-C2B d?}rb )K*2foB`mx@Zg1mM >>cCd;K *$ L)9Zc7q0l ~; !m8 $ 瘑}C볓$XNbCb@mvI#2m\S`P9xB1JQ% p ݜ6/˺&)]kމ=Ú,1H;7/O:~kg˫˫vlAcowuݪ/wr|u/}˖7pq~u O 2M߭vcZ͍}]>?}o>|{E[hxF(WQh%'v'?șݕtCXJ%9"penIY鯀8c)cjSjGD$bIAqnL *sx^hfVi#S/3yYx5He9 &uFtcMb /g) )*0d7%@p:D1Z-o'<]%{lAMlNLYGX{xr4Aˡ`p +Iv@lFnB)r78e ϘdqP `E+:C8d"piphcNA&p3{ܤϵÀ[J%AMswc11&~$F0)Y>Ѝ3Ȏuam\H5lJXH\")˲eif'((Zpګʣ! pѩT۲BDF; Ex mhetFu z$ ! kJՀG>ThF^U(N0Gq_#8v8*[XA{`hn2yC,<"EQVZk -edtݰyt# 2uC)™ueěb MO Veh NNңǧ0]rY+H 9z*)eo _۷w7n6ïu>(^]ulE/LHW$Y?x/ӫKIՖ]F~b;[w`tf==%|Z05; |ꐀ񀺘\5ji6bzN*$Qu/uxǻ'S xtŰpz=Bvg?Zoӎܙ7]A['&53a+7B{<0p 0)q@Gn RL]OL\S56C&,lQvWqm 1Дn뎹S){ӌ&sk@{KWڹN뵧1(w\%>M fu4dFhv>~W Q XkF!ԳaXIk889/ցtV;6BY; 0{(!ٻ!GaDצ93Vuꃯ<'j. hGC4N %m{%BM@ B(63 ڔd+HّHI%%f2DA0X' 6䘡9Y"@JGh>$q]|Hh`I=z %\$HfRH@ЁCDla>iNG,SlH?;%p#(G@x(qpKLxUtACJ |98 1v{s^4];3˶d@?ap&A]detC4(C33d{ȁaM' ,tMSz`)HlzmSOafrc6w8d0]xJw'5VVR};̥O 1vl'0z=B0(r11dUjE5NR;|:^I^D+0f3[e9䴊9$(7"@@HM[&~ Qx>P:zt҉g@"`y/a^Ϋxq_HGK`vxږN'!pU%V+F{VĻsb\vg^ykM ;G{\(z4 g؝֤Ai@f =| *&lн yzN-Ewtg<NwF#Di6Y}7No~k/kCW;2l;󥭗VZvLzM13>Awxq`]حm[jquh pGvG8wV?bgN*Uuplܟ&\3 N.I6Wtwް=o]=d~pg 9?&ǿZ9?&*px#pWw aC5-AOVh4b[WWƓ'4 @T)&Z%@ F@ Fa6^qʥu! >?Koҳ떟w۵ifwu:rb;6 $XB1 RI@b#|Ā#PĀd+ q[UuyZAɥK]2+g!Z0en P)йw͑Md#qs:SL|CiwzW&QN}hloٔ}$e͸We|墻gar؀dPe<@D4{(Ž*^s)9Sa" 뷤nۀS2̈́5w$L}1awFXQxNLH%[8ͳj=[@~@΁>:p;g#0z=p_ur$; b(\`t`$6O=,%cE gptP$N2`+2B؝I=46Wpk{UQkZ$tKF$pޯ;o xD (։Z\o_;rxxQX45Z#oXcWK22aǞhz`2D.v$Iq[#ߨy?|cU NąޔmgOׇDsz84>u$LMBxRnj0v(,ч/ɑ< b+:Bi?A _=(-2=pO(beuREq2r3Ĺi&\F,ɨĢ,D%ŋ]FC`43[(r>Ez&Fڃ*b%|rK.$ Q iYaDBUz h2ZO8F5_ÌS3eF`XYdž?CT&P-W@nj&oQkilEBJF=a -owtn(O dmRE0"ybh;_ْPJh7D<$1Z8Hz8>/Hf:$0isUD *nLCV*0\pBK2A؁KA!K|k7v"!h8g|0F4GG,u:q$؉=BÛalqWI]qX<.wLȐQ *+@Vj{=#$(l $[zxJt,:]_p qcRO_&R#J9B:μпW $Dv8#גPI0Ł+P.f&` <}KC=!%Ba9yjyIޣu۲2[F "'?↱eDsyހܤ=B#8m/T\l+Fp 2,jyDR;0BO DGa9CcxL4r8ۅ2ѐR $ 2SL42r,AΑI=  {$& Dnj iF|C!9⑌Gbg:9!yjtNK((u=@p[.CF[HYˉp`"ФTṮh JxIۦLc 0ڵ=;&TRh[{)[F^ β"%iXH 70wU6e Jdk@0W؍r L/Gn{K',\dX<e24%]JLcAIYQ' {FXQ|UmY?Aj] Ohi;p!=.5֮äI#cP] x_,wWuj~ӫ&5@r0`% m08p[''R(5Y* " ,$T?OG%>lQؔDʐlP`X>F#J%AF*bkoMRP8t轉a2Y4ӆ& lF(ROP@Co=uHQ L_X`1/I|P/3w}12a. z.h$Dcgac0q8r'&e+y xnY%"aa9 >hOʊ^ 2 zHp+pP4ƔOÿb -WU3% ;!`' qdPVAFtl%{?r .9\T%"30 6 L'J @ո"an'JF_@j\l}x,D0؅Gz!Qd>pAD _oCd^ÉZc^rܲ~L*j6?U5~a^Zڡux@$ʨuԝpFACtq]"'=W_߃/?Ӟ g_s'The|AFMVY^<ﰦ]ĆDBN4FN0xd:l9@*.cUnܝ"G^bVuJM#yÂP;;ׁW8rFHHKf/:8A۰N'mExhͬ' Kkk19ڀ$q ct3A5cJ#6J\,']V.m޻F{QࢴyrU [wӮ[eeE\x[%筷FWWRuR >7v4.*Y"]Ups,78t9#szw*Rb2Ą+CBX!@A="$.ѝ}KXCמΜRgnk !{̣LL贸̽*Ժd~֪j/уȽ̜<V rLx=e"&鸙R%q@L= D& gJŎ7 ,~EFVled1={BG g-iYׁ}5p]p+ 3Jk>FVa=)fisr|S`&"/>Np&M? Y9z/Xv&k"5P%bݗ^I_#&n ۿ]ړf)8ķHp&,sŜ i0%Q<.~wl[]vyFӻwl,jPbYMbZ^:%m{ju~rR Ƚl6 Zc\#M0ojGa;lb?~C.V^wtEtHϣ߁[g,**oP˦ rX.9% YdOOoiJ ΃dtʏI?7?{-?[ӿ?移 MWeIv"zE,oDOj.Y-a5.Rw?& L4JKͫe ȞSƽ!7PڭӼ`(*hBy=zT.!Cns5&&ձM8 p;-T%6h101D8(rs#R\D&[Ĝ4$ ^,Ϙ_Yr$ELaEXyJpx{5#fKsc"uLV2Ns8^!`dրTj"(ɔ$1 |)RQYdWCLS9@sL^ӚCKG,@,ѹ ,CÁH2b?uNYpl18rHD є.Vߜ=LB/`gY{a NG|.7yZ0 :$`@ ,+ 5A zUQ?͒j"vY Gl '3IwA6m単a#1*n e)a&@ {̈b8O-&D>|zNQFO $كH&_g ]e0!B2FGÿJ(UBAmh'I*$c#@`|Ev~\7ow>K_.h1 ip[zOǿ?icYO<[B0F=,L]na=c[ 0I&^YLS=g^r:Bݟ-Puvœ>}!"lr`~:|u: ƅ TtiF4 }5Vz#V۽|]nOۏw,)s7ԇ\1.F˗5Ya (!) 6$YN9'o>u+ sLlW#WA}1B@OH6#ֿ÷>)^kA>ldna2`hk)=[ M:=MQ{5YNˌ:ݭN=_v~WU'ч_v|o4tm{[hσuP(<Z{`kSa.Xw_~qoygy)2jOG_ηس=R"lØE P_˹ҹP$OPD%; ?80y P+ o "f}‡yqv߱t9b%v1_K!( d?aw$䚑/ kMfWwS{1))K;t~JjJqHZ(ctcP._f^0{UжSkYsGTG$lc20ҝ\T$ٺL:b /r%.yXo'wN{ Tpb%0n#{Z6k[s|DO-0KuHay);⮂m}zD1 gO)?>]tpq:}՝|9O _S_=]&y(ɳDuA@yz0`e~`%Wu>_iӻnqsYy.^-'bȜP'fvGk^ Q+\5snj4ǟ*DN̩_ [j~}?t}|W~t|n3̇?/>/ۏC+8 }NU݃c,V$03H/Ȅp`(";$LJL󤇴i K`wǑARRڱhd oƁΈS&[k-yB4FX A+.f逪(oJf%Q):Aa\!Zִd G)a$9Td*#X{&qIeêxHFǓh20,?&*c54;e߈hGGF$L4(# XdK`*s28PArUGMʑNp*m©I^f!3EcARR%)iLC,"-΄5:X $Q=i IDATŤ s!9&mD랎T%0Atk-.K` sa;MA^>rjy@-!#`3ۜq{fDP}Z$5P}]!4}tÔBT6+I͗a&nCЖB4@}`&Q@Y"@4b+KZ{懟}߿~/|_Hs|?_-+qoo=?Yyk۾>L_Ppiy Np$E]0r;&7/t#Tbws%'qk(S=es{ McjfH"lPf5Ve N@N )M! Ej@jNL!ۀ Pg.u@B!xw:ǜc^+ffa)!!m3"j:LI  ь0p> X!DY#O!*f SцGz݌9a5A;psf< Q)#%)9c~#*0sǍ`=JXj=0!G#] nn@m%1Ez*.p%czLœ*(P8#CJCAt"7HL9p"aeش#  ݐ4K/S v98!1J hxD3FX('܁u\&~1eOs 7tԠDkp{%ۋذ!Q Q͆5`e<SyFՂ&Ǎ7܄DܜfD$HC) v;/NƘ=9]AcT-IKCRZBCmnx;iRhu-H$ccWn:Lͣ`8Yt0[> g,jj! Z\9+ 6˿ݽ3XV|qܿYsǵJȵ:Ā|2ǥ;|PN6ܘ\EF<@&| dF&3/D׀8EJI_V|iͤT6m@l+MίN -]szA&*4.kƅu$WzjoX:<҄8/gXCx<{rB³m?꫕l(Gxsn#pql3ѠP7!.@ʎ2/#$-6χLa5|fJ`tg(w"s„d*bǑ'ŀW#~3ڸ#!( ;s5@A}>@16>;%Kj0WcQ_0n|pn %sʞ6|Պ%+C6CA'QkEՈ" [eb@4`BS_V$/+[uʛw"ja.J:T @!t+q@~3P9bp,ܲ1ƒ LIY"wpL/]Cr})r+rw&dGR0 L u@ Ʋ2e.:pb f4(}Hp!ECO^|UZ1GH,ǐ73 %QV 4ED(/*p _>#ϙ̠7+jEItmH '"R$=(%6sS8m܈l&$A `DcOW4sJp ҇,(c ^CpH3dRwT2H9KHx}p .--Rv%WD Wkj!5"YdVƌ%}ld˰V ũu.f dmCUhpi6Ľ`=B{8Xr/@bR-Ʀs8lPG ؆hm:Rٲ-zla?9h(Y:隖1[tS֚|%ƥԄ墨N5̓(f Nk MZg{c9y~P3 :|SH8f>Z@ 0\PJr pHLhB@ 9Чo߱H-̕<@{9>MTs&SVM0UŭR_ *1KF ý9?80&B Eb 8RZ1gjD0# yt} Ўz p !ġĴ{,=h Ӯ# #ъl-"E`;2ۥ']S#/֒t,5n/Ҙ)̡ ͹Kf󗤢8hw ~/nz~ߨUq>CAhCczAH$$ه"$  6Ci)BCD6 ( I,Mpqw%O1#<\rkO{trL|@fca.NkmMEY =S\SBKi;d'{2VJxB(0-ai@j$I+8!j41MH@`!;H2[є&WN(`iٿc/~'~~g]g~/~W~[͒[ѥ`?Eg-4>q u;T.,[ɜBfG#g2q 'H$&W 'z:aަ<@ӈ8"#BN{pi{]eD3졥rgMA!Q$AD%#M+TH~!=2!*!۱#qAla6lt->4}lMox<c5ZEzi.C ]D4L".gZ`vs+"zHRMdΐx8{ ij$%sJBgWF6Xh+ ˞!':KY[O!RsdW̩&plgtڅ D3t;ebNވKf`Lr[],P @@ኼ,% <3Oȝ:z+F+=0@] `7CNt!1'أ;K%pA!bvp ;P 7#(\x)v%zH_x+ǁ'8)=D#o&譜>лx}L3d75*j܇`de03FS$C[;D*C~-9l5A H rKc^[q.g/>8-BO+!s$p-1g-Mk5Wc5S #R*8U,:NM 86}ǡ{ǡ/`1bg M 3dDF~dDK"&~ՉeIN^lH߸>/yƻwShM0mR?]L/˻qE_Kg~9h\* c}5+%̋Aq[#错J .atnNPG3,GxGl+.[aJމ*EY~taqÍ" kfR  Fa8,Btr<1"nꠦHX;(cj{`A%qZ  i!J}ģܜ0 KœǪt Ds>!Ӻ1MLYFlP>*̌x~oce!.Gh{1 (<}itg CI0rjixP3O` %KŽ)x)F"]'7cfs:H[h!H5F:x$Rn5Z, ؐ4 ) װ%3.O`4U79??;n~x73ŋ$KM}yp~ydG?qOgqA[~:{H vٟn" ,.p G>:Ys(.Y+;{0eZW^(@mWŒVU|>o\ |{.ˆC);n&_]|s<8o{$`?27duށ =pn.^c8J!h:aBӝiHVw|0Y IDATͨ$S+<`UZ'YW$Av-jh! !¼$c1PGzg-`0pTr$!%,1b@% 4u;` ڥ3LXr Tt2"Ǝ`*0So4K. I 8Kf϶·-G* )%;<%qB\_SL.~H!kQZyy G,RZ~:NhYx:$;NO@sZ@Lhba])+O6;IElVj4"FPdT(PXJt0"٬L.|;%8atpUD-jSi,>lh+&V;%kd<<\ONvd݅qSxE Y8au;QNM4fWzzs~'S[uL [)D<0jvua$* _4oi~bE*>s9o_9mOqnXvP*U3 7 [˾P:Cwq$Q Ya;hI!J5yƀɆ T>G)E}1xIu=xoiw/?^ ,? +"JNYk헯icUO>W2G0qUΥ U@!6i&ֲuuH|-h&Eغ2[8SI0PR xdsܙa̴w_G^|7kPܸiX#Vѡ\"x(ps"bMgOi&@96S7T%=^_]Φ6rs\馻fG2t9'7v/o] z>gqKpl!:G = Ddp"N. xpt uo/@ƫEBBa1+" rGHI5D!RUVcB1!D'-0רBBTj 1Ȁ%˚i`$- S˜aKkVM+q̿~~}~—տ.{'~/_Dʧ~3?7'Ͽ|hӯ|bzƆЂuF jVtQ? K=H P \ƒzL1܌5$ӁۉW9- %aˏ4nG?Ko|ovf}s;~cwKݒZ-!KXc`S.2d UYc\A+1P©+ 1JjwK=7|{Byj>nZp{F& a$:v6g />/u#ڥQP~8gP1$]m;"]X m]2< ;3eg[.#e0̤H*!bEU N H0Ek c)0Z1e6&dzܛщ%Ha:ƒ̗:Otg? x/I?|bq8/ǫBBd[76<˫Yvϧd4qr9$LO.Ry  ^a;(9xki V*y c8y*haPC `apߗ[=}k<~|җ)*T1UqTݪ#ܯӴmώSr@AsVp[LYN8^ `gcۏk." f%sQ5-ѭg~6$Cװ>LQ+:dc(i&VH:OJI].\lCw?_Oozz8?ћo=.vϖ6???Ko|_oҶE$)%~Щ)"|n!aJ< 7^F̅3ψhD'd,PgV`qR=\^uY41*ӀS1B UZ"qL?T؄Gށ; 5̌iz:N E2]?{ϻdAYwJ}#b3uykQDz' -hKp Hb?88# 竺)6J4%p~YUdV{+b9*B )<8(v)[@2M"d,+1 m04AUrY(%i['>i*wBNJyd )"<)#wЦ?Y8PWA9{.FBH3S]3dKTT+- 4"M!bMT1M]P'Jh1sip(<m׾?|~V=ӾMRܣ'ͿRvgȩ(h)?W:R8qAe8^瑞XDڬj!ADEf|Giu#!b TRZyy?H??G?<O8=K>浿_u&^wox]ɜL0ICܳ "5ʩ6y(=x}D 4.`zI^7H)”#NԌVa?*Wn2;JJAPD-=]l^)ͷ-:{kasǻ6lAm[%Ztޙacڹ쏴7CMH:HqGvF`Bn; $6Q3QZXvF~ Qt/}΀iK_gǻXSA0:xuNȬ((pF%9+Vp#T<9CBCCLӪ?5?ż2pv.rDg^|dDvgcYyF̅=S:])V l*R%3.a!HFA-0T>yl#:V"Uj YDΑ=zDKc$*[u℗ $Xg3B'Qbi-;en%3h386c6C+;N]}EWuKK#EOX-a$MQ4GT2!] Aű#QLzA.Lr#&fͨk3@6!$5Qv@ t9E/0y$nH3D?=pTp!49$Pc_BX0E/CDz׋9Y.%"/n҉;|Kᆨ48 Xc9|i(ƱvRy%vҎǪ/FHy3Lƾ"R EV&J/uO+T1![uUAEՎ{vOT"X8duLGIRsˬW?so߹GSv8[WmU~#h,$Hpc]A?q~t>x[à u.1  _|LJrƲVqf8sٟ5^ (*ԍޟ5d6=Ο;@pjwڈdL6=cP$(ȴEƵa["3ѯabgM;\ WXpɾi_qpQ{XlzJ5Pv(X$8' q} SY/o3[pK頡c;AYS%chU@ Jj 7Ҟl-ۉ-fk@ (hla j%B'E)Hi"c3 LAlP.>Xoir$TN8-C*e1*.c7@b1' E0cfTͯ?lus%RAz(2OΣ_54Vc$R(ڎvmgKle˖63lC]>[Ɣ"ri e=<$]$MЂvai!Bt10~> ?tl K2MC d Vtzé62y ^㞷ekq(L;8' X!izJH2>ݘG,R_ z1{j(pIBhW&nS!5kgt8qILS8ݰ m{DH Y/cHKMAցLJg_Ɇg_΋o;>69呗w>y{1>|[/i:kCB" Fc$Hkےku;iI,X |tTCqde0E^;1UhXiyK3TYrE+$k2!dD琼\W+bǾd",VAC<{S ƠOT ַ.Fyc=JB)C[f10漹zp &XP,wIv( H (#YM& ~0AY Khmc0F@F5A1vy2,@OZ+٨8GQc+T-)UA_E / |G /ZI1PepAWK@[P$Icp[o~wz#U2 G7JvW\Woݿm}QON_2ҠX7/O,=*6; t"6ܙܻAnz&2 < ,l ( ,brE1m99QTZ+{L$vI:$/A A>Jء7:jTӨx0L ̗lAhfu }B{ 8vHZJHFp{wBѵ Sދ IDATo!'F6b$c1GZ=`xjlƾ'v8G[t*iǶPϮ,(.b 9ezې ;g /n B9'aQ CyLxwPLJE"P<9Wq5n( l}3H $2Rb9i3=K7s.4<+\t>֊gk?O?h~(Pv4[{)}$bV=<2c05i"-"!HT04NN!0{"Q<`b(սZBǎśB_"N-F  S} )I! mk_g/|Rz4`ʓj͎!ʹat,ƀi=+_5r) k W0<'|)Bzy{]˵-U|@_ɯuB3f.$|^%_nw?H:EB[-ַqj!%%- wzj똚!T`/+g@6`UUᎭw9cz3_/ƵS4C4 )ꙅ"l~v\?˿7taېvWߚ|T?TbIl əܡţ\h]HT=0bjNMGIPhX:å;L/ dlv O$ݮպ֫-GBaaQ2!cOPʉC V`d %`EW, _DYl1#(w%XIE!D\*6HGB)0Nr9I&zՆvDgl.i48 ?%r (`' ( AڏÎ,ɧIJbϻu8+d[Ծ ` ܆ hя'B沥*zݗ ܝ2if-6Ёi(㴗GK?^$Hme"%mYͤmL1( ` hB* ;VA 21RWZ1II Ox@ài6 b$zX޹$C򩪇X1U^6%RQuX\N &B9;5ժ(wt1dO@fi@ĊFXWҥ~gtj0D2~4zSXsq+<ޕBT,w2.uf%PQÂ=| D XA v`lJKfdΈVHҠ0$rON $^ = t!CCIŠ^_Ukq"vd-͓~ Y;̡ Hv{z埂nCz᮴(Lt<]OoL:~&μܱ*2| .F/qHPBRo@5^OkolSJoѐuiS}߫?Womg~9ߢ?Jg?o0zpE<q&S0)q{#M8< @29A~= 3s3sS@#Hk z6ȡ*6 h9LWFUjXκ 9lK:sѪl2 PiN8Ҩ](Z-]Ĝe %bsއnc=m_ȥkMiK~}уvrY{r>0Ӎ/YR.+cq~W;"g| C "Nb sVMSKڌ"uaR!d)iHbLKG>\ Ѳ_huv[A/2~٪G Ena;D͛ >Ԇ:6)zh1$W^$a15 ? O}$qgӋqꭷO27Ȓ@hy[<:kѯ MD1'ӃW^x˿_O+O?x` vL%PvPvnZ Fc? 8 o D9^ߖW_O};`he1u[nbAz~h9>U$ypD')| {4l+gJ*!^v p!A-ᐇlK6eYpNlG1̞|V]?cZ̃JOI)FL=Q4$ ^FOFXM;aR: NfKGAP{*!n[/XV*!wKv';Q$3c 4`) t" qcRPL2\IW)Ox8iTg;ЙOsJA:XhѼ)%뚌,6 B|Y)q{pʤ9l)Q9N?"8Ddǭ↙ɯ(qõ ¹ِy]y˞>6M߀ïL%}€{d_TTZh^x_hbW֡p:n$C莔"us4$0bJd) ~T n蚻-17ot1oG`F<85%v7{J M菶m#.E늏(}W~N%LvO4kL镹ӫ_e~Ъ]]g_>2:'  6ː͡Q@کnKh%qɼ&wϾφpxwo|ޮwym q*ʅb#yQ a]WFi Wﺀ)SFV o~W~7EA?Of fd4Yw<74peT3ZQxw)iklXdZC#YBwlHY`7$Fn| ˀɯ{muxdQ3R#)K>g?m,ؠ\XV?>ēcH~ȃg AzO uDw̖BJT}xzP&a*թ[X"΅kfx%R2@xuKĐ&GXTyE0!8iW)I4}EZp(g9iGg"NWCNV ነj@0~ }̞&Ʉ߷7'OT~5 NJ+<1rFG m֗ukUcm({N=[wF7eg:lvlX[nL)7&Cp6ps,a;,s9$a} }0N$Y,cF弤'Mـhi܏iqI2`fBkCr(rd6É01VPt ` [(Ey.;@sI W? ͒%Imؘ/ OF.NMMsj\= ^x'cT؅SoWHzk-Paw_)ޘ2қXK`X֬zYǼ4*cm颏500'0cyd[|qssPhTz?]}=5wNQckTζD 0T;/8Ύl[@84w/_snDA4z{> 9,#|%&fq7`3b| Čf_Ҟ?w_B Lc3իd&c\Abp ds 8~0YЕsu {0( 0pbq96d`UJF#+BI}LQH/ՐTd@)` ,$)q!b 掘HHKZp$MbZ15mxx`Jɸ@dfS%$BL͉z XعvϘ΁89%v}eS5b'2e-L9-"<;=e7Qr@0Vx1X| :Y)j;݅1FvMJba: f 9 /!هSД 0q VN+CK@aDԢBQ* ՠ!&b!72 BU.2-$aqbP 1UU)Aׅ (m &'X$M"߅DnIHrc>Fi%`!а[O0c)"ԭ#NDE! t䘙Jq>idK;SN1$9Ex;QJccx^mGʁvgMQZK ?sN\QYTUna $s]4B)#kx!& BؑX&N :Y"powMM~a/bϠ8c"t}D5hKgGyf Ds1]?6}%Bumk{O߻Z /Ⱦx̸)zIyszq.i-QpƂ. Uw bv%OFA >G)!f9׷7?dDŽJ{/ >Vʨ.lCxD#{|J̞Xi0R"zŁf\7o7>yx|t>%E##t! ffFd`1Cb0N5 A1:1´wb L{+= 'lA]H`Rl' Oi< NTDwq*esd[+eA>9=FL`#T lPĜΔ̀VpL2[F:R(SW)aB(q6_yP0z6O:m~§2ظ"L{!\q(ǁFx\V!a4$yo94'LCr)5c0>J4Cr.ܜ !4B) J Ta4ৄĉ@ʛglHdP)=FtP3j3k3q~L\ k2(>0#IAqɮ :PTc~@$؀ C`wt؈`!dAq"@& ١9 rWc4p'G*b-"b|Non6Y2> HhБ"l"K:XP!˘ΐ tXn23~|:|+֕Q`f6ٙw4>TQSY *$f;;;y,N9Ѭι;`~BI zNI9pN $t~ -U% O{hYנTcjw'i81Yy|>K'R{D"aڌl tHS5 P!mN;&ڇ@|_i||=ߏﭿq`'NtgGvc']yScHX)0\{Ԝ>zÿ{Ivwxs;Y/_||G#v1J%WYmf9dV画cM$v$jd8e+c 9M?m) $ߵ?!y}VSR%HF(3=w_l}6[?oO_;牅`$B$bsJe4h>S H[NFKV}Ā}WmXS׍_;-Z䃮i<"6];Ѩ3_fOq3|fg  bV(@N e= Pǁ)2E!Ys>a ,F➯`ly|I L a%(y@ I% 鸘649Evt£fhwviK"‚mD:JT34?6LPF|=1(= ZLvy)F/ݞK2t|,4B 9)`yه[ώ$@H: IDATwn4:F\|8$i$f#& 14^|tcjGO%Zu@8;d+;:9Vfs ")6DYgx53d UXT%y' ѯ~ h}}{C'gEؑ26gz1.7(uy9HbF~w)D{W{, U ږ71w{3_;uJt q\b 5'& Q8^;? pq5'J( HZ7Nh["-ίt){,[kA U P;4f ΎPUR5S2GD# $A҈?i  Pmj&3FkedΕ4,T9E[ [G\"KZDC>9kBB|(ZBOWorѯ @lz=x@$F` 3!Q`F)Kg!1]9ttF!_d@(a&üzdXΑqlpڙA`lQWb p'AI aΗED&'Oԩrs yv@ .#N5rHU-至C3i?Aē+qݩɚh,}tre'ц(sl1:W9ӠS